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ABSTRACT 
A definition of social capital consistent with Robert Putnam's use of voluntary 
organization participation is used to show participation in community development initiatives 
as being community social capital, and to locate the community field empirically and visually 
in a community development network. Network data from a 1994 Rural Development 
Initiative study's subsequent case studies of two Iowa towns is used. It is structured to show 
community social capital hierarchies using Galois lattices, from which the community field 
emerges. Vertical, horizontal, bridged and bonded community social capital ties within both 
communities are then illustrated empirically and compared in a way consistent with 
theoretical groundwork defining these terms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Network visualization has been applied in sociology since the nineteen thirties, when 
Moreno used images to reveal social patterns (Freeman 2000). Marx first used capital as a 
concept in sociology. The concept of capital has evolved through metaphorical extensions, 
until the social capital concept emerged in sociology in the late nineteen eighties. 
A localized society has social capital, group participation, in the form of overlapping 
fields made of coordinating efforts among similar interest groups, the business field, the 
religious field, the educational field, the governance field, and the community development 
field. The fields overlap and feed one another but they have been difficult to measure. This 
thesis focuses on the community field, and draws on social capital literature to identify the 
community field and network theory to illustrate and analyze it. 
Many theorists made the link between social capital and network theory (Granovetter, 
1973; Burt, 1997; Frank and Yasumoto, 1998; Lin, 2001) but visualizations have often been 
complicated and difficult to interpret. Most network theorists have also focused their 
attention in the areas of business and economics, with subjects like job acquisition. 
Computer applications like UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 1999) take away some 
of the mathematical burden of creating visualizations, but they are still often difficult to 
interpret in sociologically useful ways. This is, I believe, because most measures of 
networks have been developed to describe the networks mathematically, like centrality and 
betweenness, then those descriptive values have been ascribed social characteristics. Social 
theory has not been developed into useful network measures. The development inevitably 
happens the other way around. Developing network measures from social theory provides 
measures with greater value in sociology. 
Coleman, Lin, Granovetter, Burt, and Putnam include the existence of a network in 
their definitions of social capital, but network visualization lacks an acceptable way to 
2 
describe the various forms of social capital ties. Wilkinson (1970), a community scholar, has 
expressed the important theory of the community field, which is intuitively linked to 
networks. It is arguable that, though sociology has a functioning technique for visualizing 
network data, it is less sociological than it could be. New forms of visualization are used in 
tandem with traditional techniques to visually describe social network, sociologically. 
Concepts from social capital literature are explored to understand what is being 
measured in a community field. I focus on Robert Putnam's use of social capital among the 
key concepts of systems, hierarchies, homogeneity, fields, generalized trust, network 
visualizations and concept lattices. 
Robert Putnam's definition of social capital as voluntary organization participation is 
used so show participation in community development initiatives as being community social 
capital, and to locate the community field visually in a community development network. 
Network data from a 1994 Rural Development Initiative study's subsequent case studies of 
two Iowa towns are structured to show the community social capital using Galois lattices to 
organize participants into tiered hierarchies, from which emerges the presence of a 
community field. Vertical, horizontal, bridged and bonded community social capital ties 
within both communities are then illustrated visually and compared in a way consistent with 
theoretical groundwork defining these terms. 
Methodology 
All of the concepts are presented using data from the 1994 R.D.I. study's subsequent 
case study interviews. Using these data, hierarchy structures are demonstrated using lattices 
which inherently identify those groupings of actors with higher community social capital and 
the existence of a community field. A set of key theories is explored fully. Putnam's 
operationalization of social capital as voluntary organization participation is key to the use of 
lattices in showing the hierarchy of community social capital. That theory is fully examined 
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and all of the difficulties inherent in using it are addressed. Theories of network visualization 
and previously used methods of visualization are examined so as to emphasize clearly the 
inherent advantage of lattice structure. 
Network theory and systems theory are important in understanding the value of 
network visualization. Networks are structures of interaction where a sociologist must 
measure both the actor who is making a meaningful connection with another actor and the 
relationship itself. Network visualization should show those actors and their relationships 
and allow for the measurement of the significance of those relationships. Systems theory, 
specifically Autopoietic systems theory (Luhmann, 1995), is a way of understanding the 
nature of those relationships among actors as systems of negotiated meaning where a 
common understanding of asset ownership is being negotiated. This is how social capital 
becomes an aspect of networks and makes room for the idea that group participation is a 
valid measurement of social capital. A full exploration of these ideas is in the next chapter. 
There is a need in sociology for a way to describe concepts such as social capital 
visually and consistently with ethnographic observations, using ideas that emerge from social 
theories rather than fitting social theories into existing network models. The rich world of 
description available from ethnography is, at least in part, lost in traditional network 
visualization. The result of this thesis is a major step toward the introduction of a powerfully 
useful technique. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a need in sociology to be able to identify the processes in community 
development which explain why some communities are more successful than others at 
creating and maintaining a culture of community development where the population makes 
collective efforts for the common good. It can not be explained simply with fiscal or human 
capital explanations, but requires the use of theories of social capital. 
The application of network analysis to understanding the workings of communities 
toward these purposes has forwarded the idea of the community field. The community field 
is an aspect of a population that serves to coordinate the social fields present in a population 
and give them direction toward the goals of the generalized community and to coordinate the 
exchange of resources among those social fields to make the best use of the resources 
available to the community as a whole. But, network analysis is a technique that has not 
developed out of a strong sociological perspective. It has grown intuitively from 
mathematical properties of maps created of actors and their interactions. 
Community research scholars studying community development efforts have been 
employing techniques of networks analysis in examining social capital in communities. 
Sharp (1998) analyzed community action in three Midwest towns using network analysis of 
social capital, social fields and the community field. He showed that a community field 
generalizes a community's across a range of social fields. Social fields are groups oriented to 
a specific cause, but the community field gives a focus that spans all of the social fields. He 
then goes on to study communities using network analysis techniques and establish a link 
between the presence of social capital in the community and the ability of the community to 
mobilize for action. 
Building on Sharp, Aignitsch (2003) studied two Iowa towns using network analysis 
techniques to identify the core groups of actors composing a regime which controlled the 
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community. She showed that community social capital is causal of citizen participation and 
community action. She further showed that a regime can serve as a mechanism for 
coordinating and directing various social fields toward community-wide interests, and so is 
part of the community field. She advanced the use of network analysis to identify the 
presence of structures in the community development sectors of towns. 
Both Sharp and Aignitsch made important advancements in the application of 
network analysis and theories of social capital in the study of community development. They 
show an expectation of finding a coordinating element in a community through the use of 
network analysis and measurement of social capital. Sharp expressed a need to theoretically 
elaborate the processes of community, and Aignitsch expressed a need to explore which 
network features are most important in facilitating community action. I find that the lack of a 
fit between current techniques and the theoretical needs of community development lies in 
the evolution of techniques of network analysis. Because current techniques of network 
analysis were not developed from a community development perspective, it has been difficult 
to fit network analysis with the theories of community development. It is necessary to evolve 
a technique organic to community development to supplement or supplant current network 
analysis methodologies. 
It is necessary to develop, out of social capital theory, a way of visualizing the 
presence of actors and interactions in a community if we are to understand how different 
communities diverge in their approaches to the process of developing and furthering the 
community field. The elements of this technique are (1) the functioning of social capital as 
community development organization participation, (2) the ties that hold together networks 
of social capital (3) the emergence of hierarchies from overlaps in those networks of 
participation, (4) the emergence of the community field where those overlaps occur. 
Sociology still lacks a technique of understanding empirically, and expressing 
visually, the relationships that constitute the community field, and until we do we can not 
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effectively model change to develop toward a more effective community field. What 
emerges in this thesis is a picture allowing the comparison of the community fields in 
different towns, with social capital measures of social ties. I compare two specific 
communities to reveal variations between their community fields in relation to earlier 
measures taken in the same communities. 
Defining Social Capital 
Social capital is the capacity of any actor, a person or a group, to mobilize resources 
embedded in a network structure through social relationships (Lin 2001). It is an imminently 
popular concept in sociology, which Portes (2000) calls sociology's most successful recent 
export to other fields. In Putnam's Making Democracy Work (1993) he devotes a chapter to 
social capital. The article "Bowling Alone" (1995), and the subsequent book of the same 
name (2000) focused more expansively on social capital. They expressed the idea that 
nations vary with respect to social capital as a function of voluntary group participation. 
Putnam and Goss state clearly that "[w]e describe social networks and the associated norms 
of reciprocity as social capital..." (2002, p. 8). This thesis continues in that tradition, and 
considers the presence of social capital in voluntary organizational participation. It then 
shows fields (Wilkinson, 1970) resulting from the overlapping of interest-focused 
organizations, and considers how generalized trust arises in the community. 
While social scientists agree that social capital has great conceptual value, they 
disagree about its exact nature and, therefore, how to measure it. The widespread use of the 
concept of social capital before it was fixed in theory and method caused some muddying of 
the concept. Since an initial burst of attention, there was a concerted effort on the part of 
sociologists to return it to usefulness, by clarifying its definition, filling in missing theoretical 
backbones, and operationalizing key concepts. They did that through a careful examination 
7 
of the uses and misuses of the concept over the last few years (Portes, 1998, 2000; Lin, 
1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001; Granovetter, 1973, 1982; Portes and Landolt, 2000). 
The most popular operationalization of social capital came from Putnam. (1993, 
2000) Although he explored the ideas of many theorists, Punam focused on Coleman, Burt, 
Granovetter and de Toqueville. He defined social capitlal as mobilized assets embedded in 
social networks which can be measured as voluntary organization participation. I explore 
key precedents to Putnam then use the range of theorists to explore aspects of the concept that 
will be relevant in the susbequernt chapters of thie thesis. 
Coleman and Bourdieu 
The literature provides support for the idea that participation in community-focused 
organizations is a source of generalized trust, and can be measured as social capital. This 
chapter illustrates that common participation in multiple community-focused organizations 
constitutes the community field as described by Wilkinson. Social network analysis is used 
to show the existence of acommunity-focused social network which is measured in terms of 
social capital. 
At nearly the same time, Bourdieu (1983) and Coleman (1988) introduced social 
capital in modern sociology separately. They approached the same concept from different 
perspectives. Bourdieu was a nuanced Marxist, focused on conflict. Coleman was an 
exchange theorist. Both saw that the outcomes of an actor's social endeavors are decided by 
the nature of their social networks. Coleman and Bourdieu called this notion "social capital", 
and used it to supplement economic and human capital. 
"Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintance and recognition in other words, to membership in a 
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group which provides each of its membership with the backing of 
collectively owned capital" (Bourdieu, 1983). 
Bourdieu's specified social capital as a strategy where an actor furthered their 
personal causes by using their social connections to access collective resources and gain 
position in a hierarchy. Bourdieu suggests cultural capital, a concept related to social capital, 
as the particular positioning of an actor in the hierarchy of hegemonic power. Actors do this 
by resembling a generally accepted norm, which is advantageous in gaining other forms of 
capital (Bourdieu, 1983). 
Coleman first published the modern idea of social capital in English and was quite 
influential in its subsequent development. The concepts of social capital held by Coleman 
and Bourdieu are, in a way, separate ideas sharing the same proper name. In another way 
they are asking the same basic question. How do social scientists explain what can not be 
explained by human and economic capitals? Bourdieu's answer was to focus on positioning 
of actors in hegemonic power structures. Coleman embarked on the formation of a grand 
unified theory of social systems. 
Coleman's theory begins with rational exchange among dyads. Trust is at the core of 
any dyadic exchange, according to Coleman's theory. The first actor exchanges control of 
his own decision for control of the other participant's decisions. It is then possible to have 
perfect trust. By adding more actors, groups form. They enforce their will through the use of 
rewards and sanctions. Norms reduce the need for groups to expend resources enforcing 
sanctions, as people voluntarily internalize the group's goals as their own. This leads to 
homogenization and hegemonic rule. Social capital measures the value of group 
participation in Coleman's Social Theory. He builds on works by Lin and Granovetter to 
examine social capital as a system of network relationships explaining why some actors 
make decisions inconsistent with neo-capital rational exchange models. 
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Coleman maps out simple network systems where human capital is represented in the 
actors and social capital is in the relationship among the actors. Using those relationships, 
another actor's capital can be mobilized by the ego-actor through the social capital of the 
network relationship. These systems are specific to an outcome, so they may be useful for a 
one purpose and useless in another. Coleman uses social capital to supplement other forms 
of capital (Coleman, 1990). 
Putnam 
Robert Putnam's model of social capital describes group behavior by drawing heavily 
from Coleman's "Social Theory" and Alexis De Tocqueville's description of how 
organizational participation is a cornerstone of participatory democracy, and thus 
organizational participation represents social capital. Putnam (2000) gathered extensive 
evidence that social capital declined and re-emerged in modern America. He is at the 
forefront of social capital research positing the operationalization of social capital as 
voluntary organizational participation in a network structure. 
"Social capital [is] social networks and the norms of reciprocity associated with 
them..." (Putnam and Goss, 2002). 
In this thesis, social capital is measured in two Iowa towns by showing vertical, horizontal, 
bridging, and bonding ties within each community as aspects of the community field. First, I 
explicate the meaning of social capital by examining the concepts of links, hierarchies, fields 
and culture. In this case the focus is on community development culture, but the methods of 
measurement employed here are generalizable to any culture. 
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Social Capital in Relation to Previous Forms of Capital 
Social capital theory developed out of a tradition emerging from Marx's (1977) 
classical capital theories where surplus value relative to cost of production is returned to the 
owner of production. The system of capital investment and return is still at the core of 
exchange forms of neo-capital (human, social, and cultural). The major changes involve the 
nature of the investment and the investor, so it is acceptable to consider it as to be a form of 
capital. Social capital is conceptualized as something to be exchanged (Lin, 2001). 
In classical capital, laborers had no agency, power, or potential to act within the 
system. As long as they were paid enough to live on, anything they produced in excess of 
their sustenance went to by the owner of the means of production. It was a visionary way of 
seeing social control as part of economic production, but it explained only a small part of 
observable reality (Lin, 2001). 
Classical models of capital failed to explain how some laborers, both in and among 
industries, received more or less pay than others. If costs of production are determined by 
sustenance then there should be no differentiation. 
Capitalists saw that some skill sets, training and experience were valuable. Some 
laborers were more valuable than others due to their characteristics, and they demanded 
better rates laborers without those attributes. In neo-classical capitalism, trading attributes 
for a portion of excess value is referred to as human capital. Human capital introduced the 
worker-as-agent into the capital generation equation (Lin, 2001). 
The complexities of human capital are many, and they explain much, but alone they 
do not explain everything. Coleman in America in 1988, and Bourdieu in France in 1983 
(translated to English in 1986) both tried to address questions about how people with the 
same human capital could demand differently in the market. The answers were cultural 
capital and social capital (Lin, 2001). 
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Cultural capital is the symbolic imposition of norms on society by the elite. It forms 
a hierarchy of resemblance to the cultural ideal, where the recessive classes internalize the 
desires of the dominant classes as their own. The individuals who most effectively do this 
have the most cultural capital and can use that to leverage more favorable outcomes. A 
person who shares the values of the dominant class can use their cultural capital to access 
resources to which they would not otherwise have access. They can offer reassurance, 
through culture, of the dominant class' socially grounded rights to resources. This is a very 
`rational exchange' based view of the world, and gives actors little agency, only proficiency 
(Lin, 2001). 
Agency is introduced to actors through a network model because they choose patterns 
observed from the past, imagine possible futures and devise paths to follow in attaining the 
most desirable of the outcomes they can envision. Mobilization of network structures is 
often called planning (Emirbayer, 1998). 
Different forms of capital were developed in response to the shortcomings of the 
classical model of capital's failing to incorporate the presence of social forces. It is 
necessary to embed capital in a social system and so to have other medium of exchange. 
(Albritton, 1995). 
Social capital does not consist of metaphorical extensions of previous forms of 
capital. It is not the direct mobilization of assets. It is a series of processes for mobilizing 
resources not held by the actor. It shares that core quality of resource mobilization, but is in 
fact not itself a resource (Bankston and Zhou, 2002). This begins the idea that social capital, 
for empirical purposes, is a series of, sometimes exclusive, often related, hierarchies. Social 
capital exists in the relationships themselves and emerges, dynamically, from the structure of 
the social order. 
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How Social Capital Works 
There is some debate over how social capital works depending on the focus of study. 
Social capital is sometimes defined as resources embedded in a social network. Those 
resources are mobilized to enhance desired outcomes through four key operations of control; 
(1) control of flows of information, (2) control of agents in the network, (3) control of 
credentials, and (4) control of reinforcements of identity and recognition. Most theories of 
social capital agree on this basic definition (Lin, 2001; Portes, 2000). 
That functional definition of social capital makes it an investment with expected 
returns for the actor. As an asset of a collective asset, social capital is based on a group 
making an investment to enhance its members' life chances. Repeated internal exchanges 
reinforce collective ownership of certain assets to be used as leverage in interactions with 
other groups (Lin, 2001). Group expectations enforced through norms allow an actor to 
expect help from the group during endeavors involving agents from outside the group. 
Social capital is common to the group and an actor cannot take it with them. When an actor 
vacates a position, social network resources stay in the group, however the group as a whole 
may be reduced by their absence and whatever economic or human capital they take with 
them (Flap, 2002; Coleman, 1990). 
When actors interact, they trade social capital constantly through the negotiation of 
meanings. That negotiation sets up a hierarchy of legitimate claims on the assets embedded 
in the structure of the network. Actors with the most legitimate (most recognized) claims 
have the best positions in the hierarchy. What is being negotiated in the trade is recognition 
of that legitimate claim on the asset. In exchange, the actor with the most assets and 
legitimacy recognizes the lesser actor in exchange for recognition plus something else. What 
that something else is depends on the imbalance and nature of the exchange for another asset 
in a greater or lesser amount based on position in the relevant hierarchy (Lin, 2001). 
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Reciprocity is the idea that there must be a balance of exchange in the trade. The 
higher position actor is willing to recognize the lower position actor's claim on a given asset 
in exchange for something. Typically, the first element of reciprocity is legitimization of the 
hierarchy (Lin, 2001). In any system of unequal rational exchange, the less powerful actors 
must offer resources in exchange for recognition of control over their remaining resources. 
The inequality must increased as a result of the process of recognition. If no other factors are 
present, all wealth will eventually concentrate in the top of the hierarchy as a sort of systemic 
default. Irrational behavior leads to lower level gains in capital exchanges and of social 
capital (Coleman, 1990). 
Simmel (1955, p. 131) observes that rationalization of society harms natural relations. 
High density familial networks, natural relations, and their near extensions are the most 
frequent sorts of interactions. They are most important in establishing the bulk of common 
meanings. These relationships, which Lin (2001) calls the initial position, are the most 
telling of where an actor's efforts will lead. Exchanges in familial groups often contradict 
expectations of rational exchange models, but those relationships serve as the foundation for 
the development of social networks. 
When resources embedded in a network are mobilized, it is for a specific purpose. 
The value of the resources is determined through a negotiation of meaning, which is a 
process of rhetorical discourse among the actors involved in the exchange, and is heavily 
influenced by the purpose for which the resources were mobilized (Luhmann, 1995; Burke, 
1969; Lin, 2001). 
A hierarchy emerges. Higher position goes to those with access to the more valuable 
and heterogeneous resources. Actors with resources acquire power, allowing still greater 
access to resources. There is, then, a tendency to act on behalf of the larger group to 
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maintain the differential access that comes with power, which is the prime theorized 
motivation for action (Lin 2001). The further implication of this is that a community fields
consisting of a single group representing the full range of community focused interest groups 
should be able to act in the best interest of the community while coordinating its divergent 
elements. 
Hierarchies tend to have fewer actors and more resources at the top than at the 
bottom. Power holders control positions of power and authority beneath themselves. 
According to Lin (2001), these hierarchies form in the three major realms (1) socio-cultural, 
(2) economic and (3) political. (See Table 2.1) They can be seen as either positional 
distributions in groups, in which case they are (1) status, (2) class and (3) authority, or as 
individual holdings, in which case they are (1) reputation, (2) wealth and (3) power 
respectively. This gives a lot of motivation for maintaining position in the hierarchy. Within 
each of these realms, hierarchies form for each differential resource within the larger network 
(Lin 2001). 
Table 2.1 -Major categories of hierarchies (Lin 2001). 
Socio-Cultural Economic Political 
Groups 
Individuals 
Status Class Authority 
Power Reputation Wealth 
Many social capital theorists advocate measuring social capital as an aspect of a 
specific domain (Snijders 1999) existing in a network structure. In this case, it is useful to 
measure the community field, the upper aspects of the community development hierarchy, 
because community social capital is specific to those group's assets. For instance, 
community development groups could be measured to produce the community domain, or 
field. 
1 A community filed coordinates and focuses the direction of the efforts of the various social interest foci in the 
locality. The nature of the community field will be elaborated on later in this chapter. 
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Ties 
After measuring the actors and their relationships, the sociologist can determine the 
centrality of actors, the density of the network, the presence of holes in the network structure 
and the nature of the ties that bind the actors. Common dichotomies of ties are bonding and 
bridging, horizontal and vertical, and strong and weak. These combine with actor measures 
to create dualistic or 2-mode data (Portes, 1999a; Lin, 2001). Size or degree, density, 
heterogeneity or homophily, compositional quality, closeness, betweenness, average or 
maximum distance and centrality are common measures of the actors in networks (Borgatti, 
Jones and Everett, 1998). 
All ties are contextual to the defining characteristics if the groups or the hierarchies of 
which they are members, i.e. political ties are separate from economic ties, though they may 
be related. 
Bridging and Bonding 
Bridging versus bonding is a frequently encountered dichotomy of ties. Bridging ties 
are ties between participants from separate clusters. Bonding ties connect participants within 
a group, and contribute to homophily (Putnam, 2000; Lin, 2001). The importance of 
bridging social capital becomes more important at hierarchical levels where lower population 
group exist (Burt 1997). 
Ties dissolve and change, but systems tend to be persistent over time once established 
(Rice and Ling, 2002). Burt (2002) shows that, while critical to acquiring social capital, 9 
out of 10 bridge ties disappear after one year, four times quicker than the rate that bonding 
ties dissolve. After a year the rate of decay of all sorts of ties drops significantly and quickly 
becomes near zero. It is likely that this is because the cost of maintaining a bridge is born by 
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a single actor, within each group, at either end of the bridge. Also, most benefits of bridge 
ties are realized quickly, negating the value of maintaining the relationship. 
Weak and Strong 
Burt (2002) shows clearly that bridges can be either weak or strong. This makes 
sense, and it may even be that strong ties, but not gemeinschaft ties, are more common 
bridges because the cost of interacting across bridges is high and both parties are likely to 
maximize frequency and intensity to gain the maximum benefits up front. Also, once 
established, a decayed bridge may have very little cost to rebuild which makes the cost of 
allowing decay negligible. 
The strong versus weak dichotomy of network ties embodies the idea actors relate to 
each other with varying intensity. This is often measured by frequency of interaction. These 
relationships can be the ones across which the most social capital flows, receiving the most 
intensive attention while they are active, and which are often ended and held in limbo once 
the actors' social needs are met.. 
Granovetter (1973, 1982) supposes that weak ties are necessary for personal 
fulfillment and social cohesion and often carry the most useful information. Weak ties allow 
groups to have stability, yet take advantage of resources not available in their local group 
(Freeman 1992). Strong ties carry intra-organizational information where weak ties carry 
inter-organizational and extra-organizational information (Friedkin, 1982). 
Vertical and Horizontal 
The vertical versus horizontal ties dichotomy is the necessary result of a hierarchy. 
Horizontal ties connect actors who hold similar positions in that hierarchy, i.e. they exist 
within the same hierarchical level. Vertical ties connect actors of different levels. Morgan 
and Sorensen (1999) show that dense vertical networks lead to social capital, though density 
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(common interconnections among a set of actors) is less likely to occur across levels of a 
hierarchy. Horizontal Ties are more gemeinschaft-like and vertical ties are more 
gesselschaft-like (Warren, 1973). 
In this thesis, ties are among actors within the locality where the data were gathered. 
This is most important in the vertical versus horizontal ties dichotomy, because the term 
"vertical ties" is often used to refer to extra-local ties, assuming that connections reaching 
outside of a locality move upward in a hierarchy. In this thesis hierarchies are specified and 
vertical ties are those ties that cross levels of hierarchy within the community. 
Hierarchies in Networks 
Hierarchies emerge from unequal exchange in networks (Lin, 2000). They result in 
all sorts of inequality, depending on how that lack of equal access is settled among actors 
making exchanges for recognition of assets. 
Hierarchies are collections of actors arranged by levels with similar command of 
assets and access to resources. Though parallel hierarchies can be considered, each hierarchy 
of social capital must be specific to a single sort of outcome based asset. For example, a 
hierarchy of access to social capital for committing white-collar crimes would be different 
than a hierarchy of social capital for committing street crimes. Existing in the same 
population, some actors would occupy both hierarchies, but with different positions in each 
hierarchy. Interest group participation would reveal an organizational structure, a criminal 
field, in the larger community (Lin, 2001). 
A useful model of a hierarchy shows four measurable qualities; (1) the number of 
levels of differentiation within the hierarchy, (2) the distribution of occupants, (3) the 
distribution of the assets, and (4) the sum of occupants and resources within the hierarchy 
(Lin, 2001). These four factors can be compared within a population. 
L4 
18 
Figure 2.2 is an illustration of a group with four levels of hierarchy. It expresses of all 
the important factors Lin (2001) described. A number followed by the letter "a" (actor 
population) expresses the population of each level. A number followed by the letter "r" 
(resources) expresses the access to resources of each level. Access to resources is constant 
within a given level. Multiple visuals would allow consideration of access to different 
resources within a population. L4 has the most power to distribute jobs. The lower levels 
Figure 2.2 —Simple Hierarchy 
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have lesser power. L3, perhaps, has the ability to hire and fire with approval of L4. L2 can 
recommend to L3. Ll has no power and is not consulted during decision-making processes. 
Fields 
Burke (1969) described a system where one person can exist in multiple groups 
simultaneously, by holding multiple selves. This is an idea that exists in meso-level network 
theories, like the one used by Sharp, Flora, and Killacky (2003) where the actor is the group 
and the connection is the existence of the same individual in multiple groups. On a micro 
level, where we look at individuals as the actors and connections are interactions, the 
common methods of network visualization fail to capture the existence of a single person in 
multiple groups, forcing the use of bridges and restricting individuals to one side of the 
bridge or the other. However, there are network level theories of fields that do allow a single 
person to exist in many different fields. For Sharp, Flora and Killacky (2003), at the meso-
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level, the person is the bridge, a strategy that sidesteps the measurement of the nature of 
relationships and allowing the qualities of the individual to be the connection. 
Wilkinson (1970, 1999) said that society is a network for meeting common needs as 
well as for expressing common interests. The intersection of a society's common interests is 
a field. The field can span multiple actors and multiple fields can cover a given actor, 
bringing them together with other divergent sections of the larger society. Fields are 
unbounded (uniquely focused), dynamic (changing) and emergent (governed by parts and 
their interaction. 
Wilkinson's field theory shares a lot of characteristics with Emirbayer's vision of 
trans-actional sociology. Society is emergent and contextual so elements of society emerge 
dynamically from other aspects of society. Fields emerges from the interaction of groups 
whose interests are similar, as actors emerge from interactions of reciprocal trust. Fields 
require that the actors have similarities, but also that they interact to focus their efforts and 
mutually define the meaning of their actions. The bundles of communication that emerge 
among them are measured to reveal culture. (Emirbayer 1997: 295-301) 
Gaventa (1980) furthered this idea to include the notion that fields can be 
distinguished by what value (meaning) they put on an asset. If two fields value an asset over 
which they share some dominion differently, then conflict develops. Value differences are 
common -one group or field values the use while the other considers its value in exchange. 
The group that focuses on use value could be said to have a more gemeinschaft-like nature as 
opposed to the exchange groups gesellschaft-like nature, as Tonnies said that exchange is the 
core of gesellschaft (2001) 
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Ties in Fields 
Connections among actors often are characterized as being vertical, horizontal, 
bonded or bridged. These terms mean quite specific things. Vertical connections and 
horizontal connections are specific to the hierarchy in which the actors are participants and 
refer to relationships, in the first case, being between participants of different levels of the 
hierarchy and in the later case, of the same level. Measuring bonded and bridged ties require 
first that groups be identified, then bonded ties are among actors with the group and bridged 
ties connect actors in separate groups. 
When ties are measured between groups (groups are the actors in this case) the 
connections are individuals who are participants in both "actors". Group solidarity is 
measured by closure. Closure, within the group-actor, is the percentage of possible 
connections among individuals being realized. In this case, the nature of the associations 
among the individuals who constitute the group determines the measured nature of the group. 
The group can be formal or informal. For instance, individuals coming together for the 
purpose of performing a community service are measured as being community service group. 
If they have a structure, like a named adopt-a-highway program, they are formal, but three 
people getting together on occasion to clean up a neighborhood park constitute a .group as 
well. 
Fields are collections of groupings of actors where the actors are similarly focused 
(interest groups), where the individuals from interest groups who serve a focusing and 
coordinating function emerge from the mass to become the, in the case of this thesis, 
community field. The strength of the community field depends on the presence of dense 
bridging among the groups that constitute the community field within the society. 
The community field is made up of interest groups, people acting together toward an 
interest-focused common end. Wilkinson (1999) said that "from the interactional 
perspective, the mechanism that links the various fields of community action in the local 
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society, and the central object of the study and practice of community development is the 
community field." (p83) He continues, "The actions in this field serve to coordinate other 
action fields, organizing them more or less (through an unbounded, dynamic, and emergent 
process) into a whole." This coordination process is a generalization of the more specific 
interests of the organizations themselves and can have a more informal nature. So, to locate 
the people and organizations that serve this coordinating purpose is to locate the community 
field. It follows then, that the healthier and more robust the community field, the more likely 
the community will provide for the well-being of its residents, regardless of ascriptive 
differences. The community field focuses otherwise divergent groups toward an overall 
direction. It allows the groups to rely on each other's complimentary strengths and to 
compensate for. their weaknesses in a nearly sentient manner. 
Network Level Measurement 
Network level measurement is the process of measuring variations among actors and 
the relations they have with one another. This usually means finding out who knows whom 
and in what capacity they interact. Typically this entails grouping people into clusters of 
mutual association, or by purposive action into fields. At a micro level, outcomes affect 
individuals in small groups (Lin, 1999b). 
Social capital often is thought of as flows among groups, which can be seen as 
individuals interacting between groups (Lin, 1999b). Simmel (1955, pp. 132-139) told us 
that one person may coexist in multiple separate groups. This causes tension leading to the 
creation of a superstructure of rational (businesslike) associations dominant over natural 
(familial) affiliations. Then, there emerges an array of group affiliations. A person is 
affiliated with an array of groups, each of which treat that person as if their member-status 
dominates their individuality. The group affiliation further places the individual in contact 
with other groups; the individual becomes the point of intersection among divergent group 
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affiliations. Further, a person's voluntary and naturally occurring group affiliations (both 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft) influence heavily upon their individuality, moving affiliated 
groups toward homogeneity; this is homophily. 
This model of group affiliations gives early credence to the model of group affiliation 
measures Sharp, Flora, and Killacky (2003) use when they measure inter-group leaders as 
actor-based links between groups in communities. People who exist in multiple groups 
simultaneously constitute the bridges that link groups. There are individual measures used 
within groups to determine group assets, such as density, which is the interconnectedness of 
the people who form the group, but the group-unit makes people into assets. 
Voluntary Association Participation 
Assets exist in intra-society tees that exist on later-group levels within the society, 
commonly measured as voluntary group participation (Lin, 1999b). Putnam (1993, 1995, 
2000) operationalizes social capital as an asset of macro level groups which he then measures 
as citizens' participation in voluntary organizations. This approach has become prolific and 
widely applied. 
A lack of theoretical linkage between voluntary group participation and social capital 
is the most common complaint people have had about Putnam's work, though his empirical 
measures have been roundly praised as exemplary empirical science. Portes (1998), 
commenting on Putnam, shows that he risks a tautological argument with his model; working 
together (voluntary-organization participation) is causal to social capital, which in turn is 
measured via voluntary group participation. Measures of participation reveals what emerges 
from the actors and their interaction, relative to their starting point. Actors interacting in a 
system, measured as particular groups' active participants, indicate perpetual emergence 
rather than circular causality. 
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Gamm and Putnam (1999) follow Coleman in his contention that sanctions and 
rewards are primary motivations for complying with norms, and show that homogeneity 
encourages voluntary group participation, thus forging a link in theory between voluntary-
organization participation and social capital (as norm enforcing) and answering Portes' 
(1998) complaint that the relationship between social capital and voluntary group 
participation has not been sufficiently theorized. 
Gamm and Putnam (1999) acknowledge that this is a phenomena which theoretically 
should be found in small populations and doesn't explain the raise of participation among 
urban populations. However, large heterogeneous communities offer more opportunity for 
participation in groups that honestly reflect the desires of the participants to join voluntary 
groups, but less sanction based incentive to do so. This is the only theoretical weakness that 
Gamm and Putnam (1999) acknowledge, but using homophily (Lin 2001) effectively 
explains it. 
When Hunter (1983) takes on this issue, he shows that urbanization does not 
necessarily carry all the negativity of homogenization that is frequently theoretically linked 
to it. Due to a tendency for people to cluster within population centers, there is a sense of 
connectedness maintained, though he goes into a great deal of eloquent description of how 
this happens through the four stages of community (residual, emergent, conscious and 
symbolic) where a process similar to homophily allows the individual to feel connected 
without the need for frequency of interaction to be maintained. For Putnam this is useful 
because it allows any city to be treated as a cluster of smaller population units. This makes 
the theoretical link between voluntary group participation and the presence of social capital 
complete. 
Leonard and Onyx (2003) supplement this idea by suggesting that a high social 
capital society could be modeled as a chain of well-bonded (micro or internally) groups with 
a high density of strong links among the groups (making the leap to macro level). It becomes 
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a macro-density measure, akin to Freeman's (1977) micro density measures, and makes a 
gross social product (G.S.P.) possible for higher-level groups. This model of social capital 
keeps constant measures across levels. 
Accepting the operationalization of social capital as voluntary organization 
participation, interactions keep social capital `flowing' and expectations of reciprocity are 
more easily met through frequent interactions (Lin, 2001). This does not necessarily mean 
that frequent interaction alone will lead to relative equality among societies. A society's 
history and starting point are the most important factors in determining the outcome of 
investment in social capital. A society with a preexisting stock of resources has more time 
for engagement in organization-forming activities and the exchanges of social resources 
within that society. If that stock of resources was historically siphoned from another society, 
the relative advantage in multiplied, and the disadvantage felt by the other society is more 
acute. The exploits of the past continue to reap great rewards. 
For the purposes of this thesis, based on the evidence presented here, I will 
conceptualize interest group's overlapping participation as the community field, and the 
location of the community social capital. The assets of the field are the assets of the 
network's connections, measured as those people who are participants in multiple voluntary 
community oriented organizations. 
Hypothesis Statement 
This research demonstrates a positive connection between bonding community social 
capital, as indicated in prior work with these data, and all sorts of social capital indicative ties 
within a community field. Visualization of this is done with member lattices, a new method 
developed on strong foundations in the literature. The question used to illustrate is, do 
communities with greater bonding capital (as previously determined in other analysis of the 
same data) possess a more functional community field, one with higher quantities of various 
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forms of social capital? Meadville was determined to have higher bonding community social 
capital than Hillside during an NRI study, using data from an earlier RDI study, which will 
be described in-depth in chapter three of this thesis. The term "bonding community social 
capital" comes from, and is specified in, that study. The term "bonded ties" is a term used in 
chapter four of this thesis. The similarity between the terms is unfortunate, but no substitute 
term i s appropriate . 
H1 The community field of a community with higher bonding community social capital 
(Meadville, as determined in the NRI study) will possess greater bonded ties (as 
determined in this study) than the community field in a community with lower 
bonding community social capital (Hillside, as determined in the NRI study). 
H2 The community field of a community with higher bonding community social capital 
(Meadville, as determined in the NRI study) will possess greater bridged ties (as 
determined in this study) than the community field in a community with lower 
bonding community social capital (Hillside, as determined in the NRI study). 
H3 The community field of a community with higher bonding community social capital 
(Meadville, as determined in the NRI study) will possess greater horizontal ties (as 
determined in this study) than the community field in a community with lower 
bonding community social capital (Hillside, as determined in the NRI study). 
H4 The community field of a community with higher bonding community social capital 
(Meadville, as determined in the NRI study) will possess greater vertical ties (as 
determined in this study) than the community field in a community with lower 
bonding community social capital (Hillside, as determined in the NRI study). 
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III. METHODS 
The Data for This Thesis 
An RDI study of 99 rural Iowa towns with populations between 500 persons and 
10,000 persons was conducted in 1994. One town from each of Iowa's counties was selected 
by a stratified random sampling procedure. The response rate was 73°Io. 
Bonding capital was measured using residents' assessments of their connections to 
other residents (density of acquaintanceship), the trusting nature of the community (trust), 
and the extent to which people in the community work together (norms of collective action) 
(Agnitsch, 2003). 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics, Scale Items, Reliabilities 
(N=99) reprinted from Agnitsch, 2003 by permission 
Mean S.D. 
Acquaintance Scale Items (Reliability=.65) 
If I just feel like talking, I can find someone in Community to talk to 4.03 .84 
What proportion of the adults living in Community would you say 
you know by name 
2.73 .96 
About what proportion of your close personal adult friends live in 
Community 
3.68 1.15 
Scale Mean &Standard Deviation (Factor Scale) .00 .35 
Trust Scale Items (Reliabilit =.79) 
Unfriendly/Friendly 5.55 1.30 
IndifferendSupportive 4.94 1.47 
Not Trusting/Trusting 5.16 1.39 
Scale Mean &Standard Deviation (Factor Scale) .00 .20 
Norms of Collective Action Items (Reliability = .86) 
Indifference about the community 1.98 .76 
Failure of people to work together 2.17 .70 
Loss of community spirit 2.18 .76 
Scale Mean &Standard Deviation (Factor Scale) .00 .26 
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Factor scales were created for each measure. See Table 3.1 for full wordings of the 
questions used to develop the scale. The trust scale (alpha = .79) and the norms of collective 
action scale (alpha = .86) had high reliability. The network of acquaintanceship's reliability 
was lower. (alpha = .65) Individual residents' scores were aggregated and summed to create 
a community level mean called "community bonding capital" (Agnitsch, 2003). 
Towns were ranked by community bonding capital on a graduated scale where the top 
25% had high levels of bonding community bonding capital and those in the bottom 25% had 
low measures of the same. Towns with high relative measures of community bonding capital 
were shown to have a citizenry that trusted one-another and worked well together; low 
community bonding capital towns scored lower in these areas. Two towns were selected, one 
each from the top and bottom quarter of the ranked scale, to participate in an in-depth, NRI 
funded, study of their community development sectors in 1997. Jan Flora, Neil Flora and 
Vern Ryan were the principal investigators. (Agnitsch, 2003). 
Meadville was selected from the top quartile. (ranked 23rd) In 1855 Meadville was 
founded in a part of south central Iowa isolated from transportation corridors. The town has 
always faced difficulties associated with its location, taking four years for Meadville to be 
added to stage coach routes and another twenty years to gain railway access. Meadville is 
still an agricultural economy, and with the railroad gone and no major highways leading to 
town, it faces a struggle to maintain services. At the time of data collection it had 
approximately 1,800 citizens (Agnitsch, 2003). 
Hillside (ranked 98th) was selected from the bottom quartile. Hillside was founded in 
1867 at the intersection of major and regional railroads in west central Iowa. It quickly 
flourished as a commercial center of rail-oriented businesses, but eventually the railroad 
declined and farming difficulties had their impact. Still, the railroad persists and Hillside is 
located on an interstate highway and a major U.S. highway, allowing it to support its 
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infrastructure and some amenities. At the time of data collection it had approximately 2,800 
citizens (Agnitsch, 2003). 
These two communities were selected for similarities in demographic and ecological 
qualities, and their divergence in level of bonding community capital. Both are similar in 
terms of population, education, and residential stability. They differ in terms of population 
within atwenty-mile radius. Meadville has about 13,000 people in a 20-mile radius and is 
isolated by about 90 miles from the nearest metropolis. Hillside has about 151,000 people in 
the same area and serves as a bedroom community for a nearby metropolis. They also differ 
in median family income, percent of elderly population, and percent of population who work 
in the community or county. Despite these differences, both cities are self-sustaining 
communities with a local business base and similar governmental structures (Agnitsch, 2003) 
Residents involved in community projects served as key informants for data 
gathering. Key informant interviews served to identify locally based projects focused on the 
public good occurring within the past three years. The process identified 7 projects in 
Hillside and 7 in Meadville. Meadville projects had an orientation toward the social well-
being of local residents, while Hillside projects tended to be oriented to economic 
development and community growth (Agnitsch, 2003). 
Key informants identified initial interviewees. Snowball sampling was used to select 
further participants for the study. Each interviewee provided at least two other local 
residents in the community who were "actively involved" in the project, where active 
involvement meant others in the community would recognize their association with the 
project. Respondents could claim participation in up to three projects and nominate others 
for multiple projects, but to be considered active the person had to both acknowledge their 
participation and receive nominations from others (Agnitsch, 2003). 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 70 of 99 nominated participants in 
Meadville and 46 of 66 nominated participants in Hillside. Then, respondents were asked to 
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complete a survey of demographics and key questions from the 1994 survey, for comparison 
of project participants and the general population of the communities (Agnitsch, 2003). 
What is important to this thesis is that within each community, each person was asked 
to name up to three community projects (voluntary participation organizations) with which 
they were involved. Then they were further asked to identify any other people who were also 
involved in those named projects, and that the findings were exhaustive within each 
community. 
Network Data 
Just as money is a metaphor for material contribution to the economic system, social 
capital is a metaphor for social contributions. Values of social assets are not fixed and actors 
mat reciprocate to a different group-participant than the assets were received from. All 
things in the system are relative to the limited social universe of the actors involved. Social 
network analysis is the study of those social connections allowing for the existence of such a 
system. Social networks are made of actors and the ties among them. Within those networks 
investigators study the aggregations of actors and the movement of resources. 
"Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition in other words, to membership in a group which 
provides each of its membership with the backing of collectively owned capital" 
(Bourdieu, 1983). 
Network analysis measures actors and relationships among actors. Analysis reveals a 
system and the value of group participation. I analyzed the relational data using traditional 
techniques using UCINET, a computer application designed to analyze network data. Then I 
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fitted the data to a lattice structure and analyzed it for the existence and nature of a 
community field. 
Because the data set contains all of the community development projects in each of 
the two communities, the data comprises the relationships among all of the participants in the 
community-focused interest groups present in those communities at the time. The 
coordinating element of those community-focused interest groups is the community field. 
Network data have a few common measures, which are best expressed using 
visualizations, pictures where points represent actors and lines represent connections. The 
data must be structured to reveal relationships among participants in a group or between 
participants in two elements within a group, i.e. individuals and groups expressed as 
participation. 
Structuring Network Data 
There are four ways to model the network data that were gathered for this thesis. The 
analysis in chapters three and four were done on nomination-data structured in a two-mode 
binary model. 
The variables on the X-axis and Y-axis determine whether the data is one or two-
mode data. If the variables on the X-axis and Y-axis are different then the table contains 
two-mode data. If the variables of both axes are the same then the data are one-mode data. 
The data entered in the cells of the table may either be binary or weighted. In binary network 
data, one indicates a relationship exists and zero, or an empty cell, indicates than no 
relationship exists. If the data is weighted, zero indicates no relationship and higher numbers 
indicate more of a relationship. 
The data for this thesis tells which actors were nominated, both by themselves and by 
others, as being actively involved in up to three (3) community development projects. As a 
starting point I had data with actors on the X-axis and nominations on the Y-axis. All of the 
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actors represented on the X-axis were also represented on the Y-axis, as potential 
nominations, but the names represented different variables. A binary value is entered into 
each data cell representing whether or not that actor nominates the other actor for 
participation in the project. I had this data for each of the projects studied in both towns. 
The first way to structure the data is as two-mode binary data, with actors as the X-
axis variable and projects to which they belong as the Y-axis variable. To do this, I had to 
produce participation rosters for each project. Actors who acknowledged themselves' as part 
of the project were added to the roster if another actor also nominated them as participants in 
that project. Once the rosters were complete, chars were set up for each community with on 
the X-axis and projects on the Y-axis. A "1" was entered in the data cell where actors were 
participants of projects. 
A second way to structure the data as two mode data is with nominating actors as the 
X-axis variables and nominated actors as the Y-axis variables. In the cells is entered a 
weighted value, the number of projects the nominating actor claimed to share with the 
nominated actor, though each actor may only nominate themselves for up to three projects. 
This will indicate the frequency of contact between the two actors. This data is two-mode 
data, but because it has the same variable labels along the X-axis and Y-axis it may be 
accidentally treated as one-mode data in UCINET. 
Third, one-mode data can be structured with the variables for both axes as actors. 
The data can be either binary or weighted. For binary data, if the actors share participation 
on any project a "1" is entered in the data cell. If they do not share a project a "0" is entered 
in the data cell. To have a weighted value, enter the number of projects they share in the data 
cell. The problem in this case is that the actors were limited to nominating themselves for 
three projects, so the value will be between 0 and 3. 
Fourth, and finally, one-mode data can be structured with projects as the variables for 
both axes. The data can be either binary or weighted. For binary data, if the groups share 
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any actors a "1" is entered in the data cell. If they do not share actors a "o" is entered in the 
data cell. To have a weighted value, enter the number of actors they share in the data cell. 
The un-weighted table reveals the structure of overlap among the groups. The weighted table 
reveals the strength of overlap between the groups. 
I used two-mode binary data, the first option, because it is necessary for lattice 
visualizations. The other data structures allow for other sorts of visualizations. In some, 
actors are groups and in others actors are individuals. Relationships are shared participation 
between actors or shared actors between groups. 
Network Visualization 
The most common visualization methods are presented using a single set of data, to 
show how different visualization techniques show different aspects of the same set of 
relationships. The data in Table 3.2 (in appendix) is one-mode binary data describing the 
relationships among individual actors in Hillside. The table for Meadville was omitted. 
These Figures tend to reveal strong clusters because the data is structured according to formal 
group participation. Figures 3.1 through 3.5 were created using UCINET. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the data in Table 3.2 (in appendix) from Meadville as well as 
illustrating Table 3.3 (in appendix) from Hillside. The points are actors. The lines 
connecting the points are the actor's contacts with one another through projects. The 
visualization is unstructured and generally uninformative. There is no theory of visualization 
do give the system form. 
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Figure 3.2 -One-Mode Binary Circle 
Hillside 
1126 
1113 1028 1180 1190 
1111 ~_~~~- --~;,,i~__ -
1104 == ~=-~~+~,~ = '.  ~•~~\~~~,~~ -~~~~~ ~ ~ 
1129 
'~~~:  ~~. _~ ~_~~~ 
..1130 ~~~~.~.,`\;~`?\ 1195 
\` .-
076'  •` ~~~`~~\~.`> 
1178 
1019 
Meadville 
1054 
1089 
1196 
1011 
1027 
1082 
y ...Jh.. 
17 ' 'I rr 
~~f~ sr,:~, 
1185 
225 
243 
215 
207 
212 
1120 
1070 
1125 
1092 
1150 
1043 
tOD6 
1017 
35 
One of the simplest theories of visualization is to arrange the actors in a circle, putting 
the connected actors near to one another. General clustering emerges and it is possible to see 
the emergence of unstructured groups. This technique can be useful with data containing no 
group structure. If the data are gathered simply from contact and interaction without 
purposive groupings, this technique can reveal the formation of unstructured groups. In 
Hillside in Figure 3.2 (still drawn with Tables 3.2 and 3.3) there is a cluster emerging in the 
bottom left and another along the top. A third is on the right. Key individuals can be seen as 
those who have more dense webbing about them. This technique is most useful for 
exploratory research with a group where nothing is known about the structure. 
With algorithms from UCINET, the actors can be rearranged into clusters of actors 
like figure 3.3 (still drawn with Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Actors in dense clusters become a 
group. Actors bridging groups begin to be apparent. It is then possible to measure 
characteristics of the group such as density (the number of links among a group of actors over 
the total possible number of links), or characteristics of the positions within the group such as 
betweenness (the number of times a given position falls between two other positions) and 
generalize by considering the attributes of the actors and the network. There are many 
measures and established theoretical relationships to social capital (Borgatti, Jones and 
Everett, 1998). 
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Figure 3.3 -One-Mode Binary Clustered 
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Figure 3.4 -Two-Mode Binary 
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Figure 3.5 -Two-Mode Binary Simplified 
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Figure 3.6 —One-Mode Weighted Groups 
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Using two-mode data, even more information about these actors is revealed. The 
tables (in the Appendix, Table 3.4 is Hillside and Table 3.5 is Meadville) are structured 
according to the first (1) example in the structuring network data section. The X-axis 
variable is actors and the Y-axis variable is the groups to which they belong. The Table 
contains data from Hillside, but both communities are rendered in the Figures 3.4 and 3.5. 
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Figure 3.4 shows actors as circles and projects as squares. Individuals bridging 
projects are unambiguously identifiable in visualizations of two mode data. Actors serving 
no structural purpose other than increasing the population of projects also become evident. 
In Figure 3.5, those individuals are dropped. Only groups and their connecting individuals 
remain. The actors with the most important bridging roles are evident, as are centrally 
located groups. In Meadville, note the position off the grocery store. 
Figure 3.6, drawn using Tables 3.6 (Hillside) and 3.7 (Meadville) in the appendix, 
shows the projects as circles and the count of the actors connecting them along the lines. The 
data is structured as described in example four (4) in the structuring network data section. 
The data are weighted, as opposed to binary. 
"Multiple density" is a measure used by Sharp, Flora and Killacky (2003) for 
describing a meso-level group characteristic. Any set of linked projects has a "multiple 
density". It is determined by dividing the number of shared participants across each link by 
the number of possible links. In dyads, there is one possible link so the number on each link 
is the "multiple density" for that link. A triad has three links possible, so a triad's "multiple 
density" is the sum of the actors shared by each pair of projects divided by three, even if 
there are only two links present. The "multiple density" of Hillside is the sum of the dyadic 
multiple densities divided by the potential number of connections among the projects. There 
are 28 actors overlapping participation in multiple groups and there are 21 possible 
connections, so the "multiple density" for Hillside is 1.33. 
Simple density is the number of connections, each counted only once even if multiple 
connections occur (11 this time), divided by the number of potential connections (28 again) 
making the simple density .39. When making comparisons among groups containing similar 
demographics, density measures are related positively to social capital. (Borgatti and Jones 
1998) 
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Traditional models of visualizing networks show clusters of dense subgroups linked 
to other dense subgroups by bridging ties. Those models are useful for macro application 
because the likelihood off macro structures' constituent parts co-existing in multiple macro 
units simultaneously is low. At the micro level there needs to be a way to express all of these 
things at once; the aspects and assets of the individual, the variant natures and extents of their 
ties to other individual actors, and the way people exist in more than one group at the same 
time. 
Past Findings with the Data 
Agnitsch (2003) showed that network data can be used to measure social capital as it 
shows social relations and structural features that are relevant to the outcome of interest, in 
this case community development. 
In gathering the data used in this thesis, she asked each actor to name up to three 
community projects they were involved in. She then asked them to name any other actors 
from the town who were also involved in the projects. This offers a particularly high degree 
of internal validity because self-nominations for involvement in a project can be corroborated 
by nomination from other community participants. Laid out in a single modal table (table 3.8 
for Hillside and table 3.9 for Meadville in appendix) the strength of each relationship is 
weighted as the number of times a person nominates another person as being involved in a 
project with that person, so that relationship will range from 0 to 3, as described in the third 
(3) example in the structuring network data section. 
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Figure 3.7 -Core Structures 
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Agnitsch's treatment of the data results in a visualization like figure 3.7. I eliminated 
all relationships with strengths of one. Agnitsch restricted the population using regime 
theory, where a core structure is identified using measures of centrality. The result is similar 
enough for illustrative purposes. The visualization only shows the more connected 
community participants and the strength of the connections is expressed by the thickness of 
the lines. Hillside is made up of higher weighted connections, more densely related. 
Meadville is made up of two separate cores. 
Agnitsch (2003) showed that relational data can be effectively examined using 
network models. Her analysis revealed many characteristics of the communities' structures 
of bonding social capital, and the bridges among in-community elements. Agnitsch found 
that bridging social capital must be specified in theory to be measured using network 
analysis. 
Rather than regime theory, I examine community social capital as participation in 
groups, which are part of the community field. The relational structure of the entire 
community will reveal a hierarchy, as participation in multiple projects equates to higher 
amounts of community social capital. Applying the participation data to the Galois lattice 
structure will reveal a hierarchy of community social capital, ascribing value to each 
participant in those groups, according to where they fall on the lattice. Higher lattice position 
is equivalent to having higher community social capital, as defined by Putnam (1993, 2000) 
and further illustrated by Lin (2001). 
Lattices 
Linton C. Freeman, who originally conceived of measuring the density and centrality 
of a network, proposed the Galois lattice as the way of quantitatively visualizing networks to 
resemble the observations of ethnographers. 
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Galois lattices express two-mode data, by expressing each actor's group participation. 
Actors are on the top of the lattice and projects are on the bottom. The lattice reveals where 
groups form along lines of multiple participation and illuminates informal structures. Most 
interesting is that it reveals a coordinating, formal or informal, structure above purposive 
interest groups. It reveals the existence of a community field. 
If all of the groups in the lattice are community interest groups, the groups (formal or 
informal) in the upper area of the lattice can coordinate the elements below them. The upper 
part of the lattice is the community field. The characteristics of the community field can be 
measured for a structure that is theorized to be effectively organized; representative and well 
connected. If there is no connection among the actors in the community field, then it has no 
ability to serve its coordinating function. By measuring aspects of the community field 
relative to its whole, we can evaluate its potential and make recommendations for further 
development, such as identifying disconnected groups and suggesting key actors for 
recruitment or education efforts. 
The Galois lattice has the inherent advantage of constructing a hierarchy from any 
table of data where the variable of the X-axis is actors and the variable of the Y-axis is 
groups to which they belong and group participation is theorized to be significant, as it is in 
community social capital. Galois lattices use set theory math, where one mode is a set, a 
collection of actors. The other mode is another set, a collection of assets, in this case group 
participation. Using two-mode data, the first modal variable is in a complete set of actors at 
the top (the meet) while the second modal variable is in a complete set of groups at the 
bottom (the join) of the lattice. They both progress through the lattice in sets constructed of 
multiple shared participants. Places where groups overlap are the higher locations on the 
lattice. Higher locations on the lattice have participants with multiple group associations, 
connecting the lower groups. 
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Table 3.10 —Data for Sample Galois Lattices 
EVENT 
A B C D 
y 1 
~ 2 
~ 3 
4 
5 
6 
1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 
Figure 3.8 -Sample Galois Lattices 
In the data in Table 3.10, intersections where an actor is a group participants are 
indicated by 1's. If an actor is not a participant in a group, a 0 is entered. Figure 3.8 is a 
lattice constructed using the data in Table 3.10. 
On the left of Figure 3.8 is the full labeling for purposes of illustration, on the right is 
reduced labeling. In large lattices it is impossible to fit the full labeling. At the bottom left 
of the lattice only actor "1" is a participant of groups "A","C" and "D". On the right, actor 
"4" is in groups "B","C" and "D", then immediately above, actors "1" and "4" are both in 
46 
groups "C" and "D". On the right of the lattice, moving down from the top, actors "4" and 
"6" connect groups "B" and "D". 
This basic structuring allows the concise mapping of participation and its overlapping 
structure in any number of groups and with any number of actors, and it inherently reveals 
the structure of a hierarchy of participation and of a field structure. 
Applying Galois Structure to the Data 
It is the nature of Galois structures that any table of data where the variable of the X-
axis is actors and the variable of the Y-axis is groups to which they belong and group 
participation is theorized to be significant, as it is in community social capital, a hierarchy of 
group participation results. 
Participation in multiple community development projects indicates higher 
community development social capital. The participation data has been used in the 
construction of the Galois lattices seen in Figure 3.9. Remember that Hillside, on the top, 
was originally determined to have low bonding capital and Meadville, on the bottom was 
determined to have high bonding capital. 
Both are small towns in Iowa. Both have somewhat limited populations. This is 
advantageous, as it simplifies the picture, and disadvantageous, as all the groups are on the 
same level. No single named organization draws its participants entirely from the other 
groups. If one such group existed it would be a bridging group and entirely within the 
community field. There are several informal groups that bridge the populations of two or 
more community development groups. Further research could be conducted to reveal 
whether those informal groups ever assemble. It may be that their informal nature is 
advantageous or it may be that formalizing them would be advantageous to the goals of 
community development. 
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In Figure 3.9 are lattices of the community development membership of both 
locations. The names of each group are listed above the line and the association is listed 
below. The locations of each group are found at the dot. In Hillside there are seven 
community organizations, each located along the base level, and containing all of the 
participants of the groups to which it is connected above. On the second tier of Hillside are 
six groups of one to three participants each which all bridge two groups each, then at the 
third tier are two actors, groups with one participant, who bridge three of the base groups 
each and a set of three participants on the left who collectively bridge three groups. 
In Meadville, there are also seven groups along the bottom that have been identified 
as contributing to community social capital, then 9 groups that bridge two groups each, but 
four of them have only one participant. On the third tier are two groups. The first group has 
two participants and the second group has one participant. The actors in each group share 
participation in the same organizations. 
The actors at the top of the lattices have more community social capital, using 
participation in voluntary community organizations as a measure, because they are inherently 
those actors with the most participation. The data have been structured in such a way that 
group participation has revealed the informal structures of the community development 
sectors of Hillside and Meadville. This structure makes it possible to identify the community 
field and to analyze the community development sectors for the presence of various forms of 
social capital, returning the thesis to the hypotheses from chapter one. 
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Figure 3.9 - Galois Lattices 
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Iv. DATA ANALYSIS 
Member Lattices 
This thesis uses a network visualization technique for data analysis that diverges from 
any of those presented in chapter 3. The visualizations used in this chapter, member lattices, 
emerge from the Galois lattice but in a simplified graphic. The member lattice focuses on 
groups' structural locations with the community and community field. The data is structured 
by emergent groups. From the Galois lattice, the total number of members in each group is 
represented along with the levels of hierarchy and the connections among the groups. All 
connections across lines of hierarchy are inherently vertical and all members of a group are 
inherently horizontally connected to one another. Actors on levels above the first level are 
more connected, both horizontally and vertically, than actors on level one. 
Groups at each level of hierarchy connect to the same number of projects below 
themselves. Group participation is the operationalization of social capital. If any actors had 
been members in more than three projects then there would be another level to the hierarchy. 
Actors were not able to be members in more than three projects due to how the data were 
gathered. 
Member lattices show a natural clustering that matches hierarchical Euclidian 
structural equivalence matrices from the same data. Structural-equivalence matrices reveal 
the relationships between any two actors. The hierarchy that results from those matrices 
exactly matches the structure of the Galois lattice, though the lattice is much easier to 
understand visually and is more revealing of the informal structure of the population. For 
comparison purposes, I have included the Euclidian structural equivalency matrices for 
Meadville (Table 4.1) and Hillside (Table 4.1) in the appendix. The superiority of lattices is 
immediately evident. 
50 
In member lattices individual identities are not shown. All values are relative to the 
local populations or the total number of possible occurrences of a given situation within the 
population. All values fall between zero and one. 
The lattices in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are the foundations of all subsequent lattices. 
Those figures express the level of participation in formal and informal group. The 
hierarchical level of each group and the connections among them are shown. The numbers 
above each group (ie 1 a, lb, 2a, 3a) are labels, for reference. The number in the label is the 
level of hierarchy where the group will be found. The letter is the position of the group form 
left to right. 
When considering the "unique-members lattice", Figure 4.1, the numbers do not 
represent the presence of actors occurring at higher levels of hierarchy. Each number is only 
the quantity of actors unique to that location. The sum of the groups at all of the levels is the 
total population. 
In the "total-members lattice", Figure 4.2, the membership of each group includes 
participants from higher level groups that are connected, and so the number represents the 
total population of actors present when the acknowledged participants assemble. The result 
is that the sum of the populations of level one group's is larger than the total population, so 
long as there is at least one level two group. 
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Figure 4.1 -Unique Group Membership Lattice 
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Figure 4.2 -Total Group Membership Lattice 
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Computing Member Lattice values 
The actor in a member lattice is a group. The actor-group's population, either unique 
or total, becomes a representation of the group. Relationships among the actors are also 
represented. Using the four member lattices in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it is possible to determine 
bonding, bridging, horizontal and vertical social capital within the hierarchy, for each 
location. 
An actor's bonded ties score measures the degree to which an actor is enmeshed in 
the community. An actor's bridged ties score measures the potential of that actor to bring 
together otherwise disconnected groups. All connections (lines) are inherently vertical, and 
each level is horizontal. An actor's vertical ties score measures the potential of that actor to 
connect groups from different hierarchical levels. An actor's horizontal ties score measures 
the portion of the community with which an actor is connected. All measures are considered 
to be intra-located to the community, so a bridge in this case is between groups in the 
community rather than leading out of the community, and a vertical tie is vertical to the 
hierarchy within the community and not reaching to groups from outside of the community. 
Scores for the various sorts of ties are determined as follows. The name of the tie and 
a brief description of how to arrive at a score are described in Table 4.3. At the right of the 
table, scores are figu-red for four sample locations in Hillside. Discussions of the techniques 
for computing scores accompany Figures 4.3 through 4.6, which show the detailed values for 
each group. 
It is possible to figure demographic data, by looking back to the Galios lattice and 
running traditional statistical models stratified by the location of the individuals on the 
unique group member lattice (Figure 4.1), though that was not done for this thesis. 
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Table 4.3 —Ties and their descriptions for Member Lattices 
Name Description 
Sample math for Hillside groups 
2a 3a la 3b 
Bonded 
Connected level 1 
population/ total 
level 1 populations. 
17/67=.25 32/67=.48 10/67=.15 36/67=.54 
Bridged 
Base connected 
groups/total base 
groups. 
2/7=.29 3/7=.43 0/7=0 3/7=.43 
Vertical 
Connected groups off 
level/total groups off 
level. 
3/10=.3 4/13=.31 2/9=.22 4/13=.31 
Horizontal 
Actual number of 
people in contact/ 
total population 
11/46=.24 23/46=.5 10/46=.22 26/46=.57 
Computing Social Capital Tie Values in Member Lattices 
Bonded Ties 
First, choose a grouping to be ascribed a value, i.e. la, 2a, lb, etc. That group will be 
referred to as the "key group". Bonded ties are determined using the using the total group 
membership lattice (Figure 4.2). The numerator is determined by the total population of 
level-1 groups connected to the "key group." Trace ties from the key group to all connected 
groups in level-1. Sum those group's values. 
As an example consider group "3a" in Hillside. It is connected to " 2a" and "lb". 
" 2a" is in turn connected to "la" and " 3a". The total population of level 1 groups connected 
to group " 3a" is 32 (10, 15, and 7). 
The denominator is the sum of the actors in the level one groups of the "total 
members lattice". In the case of Hillside, it is 67, in Meadville it is 91. For " 3a" in Hillside 
the numerator is 32 and the denominator is 67, 32/67=.48. 
Multiple occurrences of actors are figured into the numerator and denominator, 
therefore members with multiple points of contact are differently weighted. This allows for 
duplication of actors who are members of multiple groups throughout the population shows 
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the degree to which an actor is enmeshed in the community. The number will be between 
zero and one, allowing the weighted scores to be compared. 
Bridged Ties 
Either Figure 4.1 or 4.2 may be used because a group's bridged ties value is 
determined by counts of connected group's rather than the populations of those groups. The 
numerator for bridged ties is determined by counting the number of groups which the key 
group serves to connect, from level- l . This is done by tracing from the key group to level-1, 
like it was done for bonded ties, and counting the level-1 groups to which the key group is 
connected. Group "3a" in Hillside is connected to three level one groups. 
The denominator for bridged ties is determined by the total count of level-1 groups. 
It is listed on the right side of Figures 4.1 and 4.2. In Hillside the value is 7, so group "3a" 
has a value of 3/7=.43. 
Bridged ties are measures applicable to the members within each cluster and indicate 
the degree to which each grouping serves as a connection among other groups within the 
community. All level one groups have a value of "o" because they do not connect any 
groups from level- l . 
Vertical Ties 
Either Figure 4.1 or 4.2 may be used because a group's vertical ties value is 
determined by counts of connected group's rather than the populations of those groups, as the 
bridged ties score does. The numerator for vertical ties is determined by counting the 
number of groups from other levels which are connected to the key group. This is done by 
tracing down from the key group along the ties, through all of the lower levels and counting 
those groups. Then trace up from the key group along the ties, through all of the higher 
levels and count those groups. The key group, "3a", in Hillside is connected to two groups 
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("2a" and "lb") directly, then through group "2a" to two more groups ("la" and "lc") 
indirectly. The numerator for "3a" is 4. 
The denominator for vertical ties is the total number of groups on levels other than 
the level of the key group. Those totals are listed by level on the right side of Figures 4.1 and 
4.2. In Meadville, for group 3a on level 3, the value is 13, so group "3a" has a value of 
4/13=.31. 
An actor's vertical ties score measures the potential of that actor to connect and coordinate 
flows of communication and resources among actors from different hierarchical levels. 
Groups at different hierarchical levels have access to different resources, and so this 
coordination function is vital to the flow of resources through the community field to where 
they are most needed. 
Horizontal Ties 
The numerator for "horizontal ties" is determined by the total number of people with 
whom the group members are in contact. This is perhaps the most difficult number to 
determine. It is necessary to use the unique member lattice. From the "key group", trace the 
ties to level one groups. Note each of the groups on level one which are connected to the key 
group. Next, for each identified level one group, identify all upwardly connected groups. 
Sum the values of all identified groups to find the total number of people with whom the key 
group is in contact. Include the key group itself in all calculations. 
As an example, consider Hillside's group "3a". Group "3a" is in direct contact with 
groups " 2a" and "lb". Though group "2a", group "3a" contacts group "la" and group "lc". 
Therefore, "3a" is connected to "la", "lb" and "lc" on level one. Tracing back up from 
those groups, contact is made from the key group "3a" directly with "la", "lb", "lc", "2a", 
"2b", " 2c", "3 a", and "3b". All of those actors share membership in a level one group with 
"3a". The sum of those group's members, from the unique member lattice, is 23. 
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The denominator for horizontal ties is the total population of all the groups. This is 
the sum of the actors in each tier, as listed along the right side of the unique members lattice. 
In the case of Hillside it is 46, and in Meadville it is 70. 
Horizontal ties are measures applicable to the members within each cluster and 
indicate the portion of the population that they should know, because they are in contact. 
Implications of the findings 
This research demonstrates that there is a positive relationship between bonding 
community social capital, as indicated in prior work with this data (Aignitsch 2003), and all 
sorts of social capital indicative ties within a community field, as detailed in Figure 4.3 
through Figure 4.6 using member lattices. For purposes of analysis, Figure 4.7 represents the 
data from figures 4.3 through 4.6 on a single page. 
Community fields are effective coordinating bodies when they draw together 
representatives from as many groups into as concise a place as possible. Drawing from the 
literature in chapter two, the community field, in its role as leader and coordinator of the 
community development organizations, will act in the best interest of the community at-
large. It will provide a shared vision and direction for the community, built from the desires 
of the base groups as expressed through their representation in the community field. It will 
facilitate the movement of assets to where they are needed most, supporting the weaknesses 
of some groups with the strengths of others for the betterment of the community as a whole. 
(Wilkinson, 1970, 1999) This is the theory around which the measures of bonding, bridging, 
vertical, and horizontal ties were designed. 
The community field in member lattices focuses groups from one level by bringing 
together representatives from each group into groups at higher levels. At the top, ideally, is 
one group with connections (through other groups) to each of the groups at level- l . There is 
value in distributing coordination across smaller groups, because it reduces the possibility 
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that a group of elite can take control of the community development sector and direct it 
toward their own interests. At least one of each member of the base interest groups is present 
in the second level in both Meadville and Hillside, so there is at least some coordination 
possible between all of the community interest groups in the community. 
Figure 4.8 shows the average scores and standard deviations for each bridge type at 
each level in the community fields in both towns, drawn from Figure 4.7. At the bottom of 
the figure is the average of the score for the field as a whole. Across the board Meadville 
scores higher than or equal to Hillside. In the averages section at the bottom, the score that 
represents the community fields as wholes, the scores are all higher for Meadville. This is 
entirely consistent with the four hypothesis proposed in chapter one. 
Thus far, I have visually and empirically measured the elements of the community 
fields of two Iowa towns. To do this, I have used established techniques of network 
visualization like the structural equivalency matrices, and emerging elements of network 
visualization like Galois lattices. In making empirical measurements of social capital in the 
community field, sociological theory was applied to develop new methods. I find this 
superior to attempting to draw out sociological inferences from existing techniques. Now I 
will discuss the implications of this technique and some aspects of the theories that went into 
its development, lending to the validity of the measures taken being appropriate for a 
community field. 
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Figure 4.3 -Group Member Lattice, Bonded Ties 
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Figure 4.5 -Group Member Lattice, Vertical Ties 
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Figure 4.6 -Group Member Lattice, Horizontal Ties 
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Figure 4.7 -Group Member Lattice, All Ties 
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Figure 4.8 -Average Ties by Level in Community Field 
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v. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The community field is a complicated structure, with properties implied by its nature 
that require further discussion. For a community field to function it must coordinate the 
efforts of the social fields present in the community. It must give them a common focus and 
allow for the completion of long term goals, that may be out of the grasp of any one 
organization. The community field is the place where the strengths and weaknesses of the 
elements of the community field are balances. If three groups have strengths which 
complement one another, but not in ways that allow any two to make direct exchanges, the 
community field allows the exchange to take place. It is the body that allows generalized 
reciprocity to work, and without it community development efforts will start and stop, b ut 
the community as a whole will be stifled and reduced. It is necessary to understand how to 
measure something so powerfully important, and the use of lattices is a starting place. I will 
now discuss why that is and where we may go next. 
Homogeneity and Homophily 
Simmel (1955) provided groundwork for Lin's use of homophily when he suggested 
that those with common interests tend to draw together. Homophily is the tendency for 
actors to interact with other actors like themselves, for reasons of positive sentiment. A 
closed group is one where all actors are in contact with all other actors and there is no 
interaction with non-group-members. A measure of how closely a group resembles that 
description is called closure. The inverse of closure is openness. Closure contributes to 
homophily and helps preserve those assets within a group. Openness is important in 
maintaining beneficial flows of network embedded assets (Coleman, 1990; Lin, 1999b; 
Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992). A group must be closed in respect to some assets and open 
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in respect to others depending on whether the group is trying to acquire more resources or to 
preserve existing resources. 
Groups control resources by controlling flows of information. Within closed 
homogenous groups, altruistic motives incorporating mechanically bounded solidarity and 
values are sufficient for control. Outside of these conditions it is necessary to use rationality 
and enforceable trust for control. This is a fairly strong equation of the ideas of gemeinschaft 
and ties of closure, so ties of closure alone cannot explain rational interaction and do not 
necessarily follow the rules of rational interaction. 
Homogeneity defines a group's boundaries. It is also possible to conform to multiple 
group identities and internalize their divergent goals. Groups with internal conflict, like the 
"log cabin republicans," can result. By cutting overtly across lines of homogeneity, 
organizations can, at least partially, realign a culture as members are forced to reconcile the 
conflict. 
Bourdieu's Marxist conflict based model rewards actors for their ability to imitate the 
dominant culture. His vision of society suggests the need for revolution to realign 
hegemonic powers (Bourdieu 2000). In the end, for Bourdieu change requires class-based 
symbolic violence. For Coleman change results from systems of exchange. 
Lines of homogeneity form the participation of groups of actors (one or more people). 
Groupings of related groups emerge. A hierarchy forms, where some groups serve a 
coordinating role within the larger group. For the purposes of this thesis, the larger group is 
the locality, or town, containing all of the community-focused organizations. 
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Relational Models 
Simmel (1971, p. 69) calls society a "supra-singular structure." In doing so he lays 
the groundwork for defining networks as large series of interrelated groups. Those objects 
and relations contributing to the community field are the focus of study for community 
theorists, and others are set aside. 
Actor's interactions construct social networks, so whatever the nature of social capital 
and what will ultimately be explained through measurement, we must begin with the idea 
that we are measuring actors and their interactions. 
Traditionally, variable measures of assets were ascribed to isolate bodies. The 
interactions among them have traditionally been expressed as causal variable relationships. 
Using theory as a starting point to predict that something causes something else, variables are 
measured in an isolated way and a relationship is inferred from the association of the 
variables. 
In a relational model actors and their relationships are observed. Both actors and 
their relationships are treated as independent variables, theoretically presupposed to explain a 
dependent variable. To measure the relationships among participants of a network, actors 
and their relationships are designated to serve as independent variables according to the 
theory being used. Common network measures include frequency and nature of contact, and 
acquisition of essential and universal needs (Fortes, 1999a; Lin, 2001). The key distinction 
between traditional models and relational models is that in relational models, the distinct 
aspects of the system are assumed to be interrelated and dynamically emergent. The actors 
are changed by the relationships they hold and the relationships are formed by the actors, 
cyclically (Emirbayer, 1997). 
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Networks of Interaction 
Emirbayer (1997) tells us that simply studying actors or relationships is insufficient to 
understanding society, because actors are embedded in the context of their actions and 
transactions. The ego/actor is an element, though a key one, in a system that includes 
relationships, forms of capital and innumerable other actors. He further recommends a trans-
actional approach to understanding networks as dynamic, in a process rather than as static 
ties. This requires measuring change over time which requires in turn describing concepts 
and processes of interaction. Concepts out of context become meaningless, for example 
measuring freedom is meaningless, but measuring `freedom to' or `freedom from' is 
substantial and captures that elusive element of transaction. The concept of freedom emerges 
from something else; freedom to own property requires measures of property and ownership, 
or the concept emerges from other levels, an American tourist addressing a French shop 
keeper on an individual level, gains or suffers from macro level Franco-American relations, 
which verge into cultural capital. Even on the internal level, what Luhmann (1995) would 
call the psychic system, Emirbayer shows us that the ego emerges from a field of alters 
(Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer 1997). 
Analyzing social networks requires measuring and understanding actors, interactive 
relationships, and the process of relations. This is best accomplished with the use of network 
visualizations as an analysis of actors' patterns of stratification and cluster analysis where 
direct and indirect ties among actors are used to see embedded processes emerge from inter-
connections. Any one concept can be best understood when compared to measures of related 
concepts, and in a temporal fashion (Emirbayer 1997). Temporality (change over time) 
reveals actors' agency through their engagement (reproduction and transformation) in 
structural environments. By measuring processes it is possible to reveal how actors took the 
past, imagined possible futures, and chose the (hopefully) best outcome (Emirbayer, 1998, p. 
970). 
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Social Systems 
Coleman (1990) developed a theory of social systems to address actions that don't fit 
with rational exchange theory. He uses normative theory, which is the idea that people 
change their behavior to comply with societal norms. Coleman (1988) theorizes that norms 
are the mechanism keeping groups solid because normative actions are exchanged for access 
to resources. Lin (2001) theorizes that norms are used by groups to protect assets and build 
homophily. The cost of maintaining norms within the group is very important. In a series of 
reactions to one another's ideas, Lin and Coleman evolve the idea that people make 
exchanges in search of better outcomes by considering the actor making the exchange within 
the context of their social system. Their motivations are sensible in light of group normative 
pressures and the role of participation within the larger system. 
In consideration of the exact nature of social systems, Luhmann (1990, 1993, 1995) 
contends that society is Autopoietic (self-maintaining). He holds that social order is a system 
of constant negotiation of borders, carried out through the exchange of meaning, back and 
forth among actors. In response to the contentious issue of whether the exchanges are 
formative of the actors natures, (positions in the system are more important than the 
individuals occupying them) or if the actors form and determine the relationships, (the actors 
unique identities form the system), he contends that one can not exist without the other. This 
is an absolutely key idea. It is obvious to an uninformed observer, going to surface validity, 
that a person is the product of their environment. It is also clear that the people in a position 
change the position by their unique presence; the new boss is not necessarily the same as the 
old boss, and so agency is maintained. 
A unique model of social systems emerges from this viewpoint which is useful in 
applying the concepts of social capital. Social systems engaged in the exchange of social 
capital must consist of actors, making the exchanges, and connections among those actors, 
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across which the exchanges can be made. According to Lin (2001), the social nature of the 
system is primarily motivated by the need to preserve existing assets and secondarily by the 
desire to extend access to assets. But, in an effort to do so, people constantly take actions 
that risk the loss of those assets. Failure to acquire further assets can even result in the loss 
of extant assets. In reality, absolute safety is unachievable; risk minimization becomes the 
primary means of asset protection (Luhmann, 1993). Actors in networks have limited 
perspectives. The key to minimizing loss is good decision making, which is only possible 
with good information. So, a source of information that can see network positions beyond 
the actor's immediately viewable area, or from a different point of view, is a valuable source 
of information. Luhmann calls that actor with a better perspective a second order observer. 
By this way of understanding the system, we come to a place where people can 
attempt to be rational by trying to understand all of the risks they face. With limited 
knowledge of the network they live in, actors can act irrationally while attempting to 
compensate for unknowns. Therefore it is useful to have relationships with trusted people 
who have different perspectives on the system. Some assets may be offered in exchange for 
knowledge to preserve the greater part of the remainder of the assets, or to balance an uneven 
exchange of recognition of held assets (Luhmann 1993). 
Generalized Trust 
Trust is the expectation an actor holds that their actions on behalf of others will be 
reciprocated. Generalized trust is the expectation that reciprocity may come from a source 
other than the one for whom the initial action was taken, and may not go directly to the initial 
actor, but that taking action for members of the community have an eventual return. 
Generalized trust is sometimes called generalized reciprocity. 
The internal structure of a social system typically is viewed as actors (individuals or 
groups) connected for some purpose (Granovetter, 1973; Simmel, 1955; Tonnies, 2001; 
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Frank, 1998). An actor's primary set of ties most influences with whom they interact 
frequently (Frank, 1998). The primary group is a field of all frequent ties, strong and weak, 
existing at a given point in time. The sociologist sorts out the actors and the ties that connect 
them then interprets what those actors and ties mean; what can be done to them to make for 
an equitable system. 
The purpose of these ties is to mobilize resources, because different people have 
differential access to resources. Just like financial credit to purchase physical goods, a 
person may be able to get another person to mobilize a resource on their behalf, thus 
incurring a debt (Frank, 1998). But it is not necessarily an individual debt; rather it is a debt 
to the system to be repaid at some point elsewhere. 
Actors are sub-systems. The actor takes meaning from the system and compares it to 
memories (historic meanings) then alters it and reintroduces it to the system. Meaning is an 
asset to exchange across connections. Meaning is the embodiment of network resources 
(Luhamnn, 1995). 
Network exchanges happen as exchanges of meaning. Actors offer information into 
the system to redefine some part of the system as more or less of a risk. Greater knowledge 
of risks is a valuable asset, to be exchanged for recognition of an actor's ownership of assets 
and position as well as for other assets (Luhamnn, 1995). 
The information provided by a second order observer must be accurate and in the best 
interest of the ego-actor, or the second order observer won't be trusted in the future. In a 
network system every actor has the opportunity to be another actor's second order observer. 
Actors serving as second order observers for multiple other actors in a community 
hierarchy become a part of the community field. Second order observers have the 
opportunity to acquire greater resources through dishonesty, but must maintain the trust of 
the other actors in the field or risk loosing their position. The formation of organizations 
allows for the creation of generalized trust as a minimal cost, .which allows for set of trusted 
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second order observers, the field. Securing assets is the primary motivation in exchange 
systems, so this necessitates trustworthiness in second order observers and gives credence to 
the idea that a small representative body is an ideal form for a field to take (Luhmann, 1995; 
Putnam and Goss, 2002; Wilkinson, 1999). 
Community Network Systems 
Above, a self sufficient system, constantly negotiating various kinds of resources, is 
described. Information does not exist independently of the system that created it, and so its 
various expressions in research cannot be measured independently of the system 
(connections) and the actors (egos and alters) whose internal negotiation of meaning is as 
important as the external negotiations among actors. Society, and the forms of capital that 
serve as currency, are created by the self reference of communication consisting of 
information and understanding. The result is a common meaning, altering the structure of the 
society that created it (Luhmann, 1990). 
Meaning, then, is created by further reference to formerly negotiated meanings. This 
happens temporally. New meanings constantly replace old ones. Groups share similar 
meanings for key assets as those meanings diverge from a wider population. A network 
system emerges from this shared meaning bounded by connected actors with consistent 
meaning. For instance, all people who feel a given place is a good environment in which to 
live are part of a shared system, and likely also be found in the same locality. The meaning 
applied to "a good place to live" would share, to various degrees, the common asset of a 
specific place. The people who share a meaning may not be in contact, but because of flows 
in the system, those people who are engaged with one another in the definition of a given 
meaning will likely come closer together in their shared meaning and that shared meaning 
will likely diverge from other groups which are not connected to them. Here we bring in the 
common systems concept of density and inter-connectedness leading to homogeneity 
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(Luhmann, 1990). Self identified interest groups must contribute to the field of which they 
are a part. 
For Lin, Granovetter and Portes, networks are systems of interactions among people 
for the purpose of maintaining and accessing resources. Lin (2001), condensing the other's, 
treats interactions as patterns among actors which evolve as resource patterns linked in 
interaction patterns. Interaction patterns, observed as frequency and nature of contact, frame 
the structure of exchanges, or mobilizations, that happen in the context of those interactions. 
This process is motivated by a desire on the part of actors, first to maintain those resources 
and capitals they already hold, then to extend the holdings; minimize loss then maximize 
gain. This happens by seeking to use exchanges to legitimize claims to assets embedded in 
the network. Among equals, it is an exchange of recognition of one's assets for recognition 
of another's. In reality, one side typically has fewer resources and can offer less valuable 
recognition, and so needs to balance the equation; recognition of claims for recognition of 
claims plus something else, often legitimization of dominant power status. An example 
would be an actor paying taxes in exchange for being allowed to keep the remainder of their 
income. Lin also hypothesizes that social capital accumulates significantly faster than any 
other sort of capital but has higher costs associated with its use, and so interactions outside of 
a person's primordial family and local bonded extensions are carried out primarily for 
accessing social capital. This carries with it the understanding that social exchanges are 
primarily carried out for purposes of recognition in efforts to minimize loss (Lin, 2001). 
Community in Fields 
Brint (2001) has made the most complete recent reexamination of the concepts of 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. He defines community, gemeinschaft, as groups of people 
with common activities or beliefs constrained by affect, loyalty, common values or personal 
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concern, a lot like Wilkinson's (1970, 1999) fields. In these constraints that delineate 
community, motives are of key importance, as with Wilkinson's interest groups. 
Brint (2001) then goes on to divide groups into a gemeinschaft typology based on 
whether the group is geographic or choice based, then activity based or belief based. Among 
choice groups the divisions include concentration in space and frequency of face-to-face 
interaction. Geographic groups are divided by frequency of interaction, but spatial 
concentration is assumed. These divisions can be useful in identifying which groups will be 
part of a social field. 
Although Wilkinson's idea of fields parallels Simmel's (1955) view of society's 
group affiliations, Wilkinson envisioned the lines as less concrete than Simmel did. Lin 
(2001) uses the idea of fields as a way of bridging the conceptual divide between the units of 
individuals and groups, by way of fields of institutions in networks. Wilkinson saw the 
community field, a particular social field that is focused on local community (the place where 
most needs are met) based needs ~s being gemeinschaft-like, at least on the surface, though 
exhibiting many gesellschaft-like features underneath. Wilkinson (1999, p. 16) provides a 
ray of hope that locality-based frequent interaction can build gemeinschaft-like bonds that 
transcend rationality. This is partially because locality increases homogeneity. If an actor's 
extra-local bonds are too numerous then there is a strong temptation to leave as a response to 
the psychological cost of maintaining extra-local ties, which tend to be vertical and bridging. 
It is easier for asset-rich actors to maintain bridges, and so further their local power. 
Granovetter (1973) devised the weak-strong continuum of ties to be determined by 
frequency, intensity, intimacy and reciprocity. The ease with which asset-rich actors 
maintain bridges is partially because the locality based community ties can be weak, relative 
to other ties (Warren, 1973) when placed along the weak-strong continuum. In those respects 
it is often the case that the strongest ties will be vertical and the weakest will be horizontal. 
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Hierarchies in Networks 
The number of levels there are in a hierarchy effects the relative distribution of 
resource across the hierarchy, as well as the size of each level. A hierarchy with many levels 
has a large effect by level. A hierarchy with fewer levels has a lesser effect by level. This 
means that two actors, one closer to the top and the other closer to the bottom of a hierarchy, 
are likely to have more similar access to resources in a hierarchy with few levels than in a 
hierarchy with many levels. In a hierarchy with fewer levels, two random actors are more 
likely to have similar access than in a hierarchy with more levels. (Lin, 2001) 
Lin showed that social capital was not as useful for actors at lower levels of an 
income hierarchy in getting better jobs (Lin, 2001; Lai, Lin and Leung, 1998). Silverman 
(2001) finds that reliance on social connections for job acquisition among low class 
(hierarchically speaking) populations leads to low paying jobs. 
Historically, differential access to technology has enhanced human capital 
(colonialism) and caused an imbalance in control of resources (forced recognition of claims 
on assets.) Those claims have lasted as individual property rites and social capital into the 
modern age. Once a stable hierarchy is established, it becomes possible to try to change the 
structure of the hierarchy, but historical conditions are the most important factor in predicting 
outcomes (Lin, 2001). 
Hierarchies form along lines of access to capital of all sorts. The actor with the most 
access to a particular resource tops that hierarchy. The actor with the least direct access, but 
still able to mobilize the asset, is at the bottom (Uzzi and Gillespie, 1999). Hierarchy tends 
to have fewer actors at the top level than at lower levels (Lin, 1999a). 
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Measurement Issues 
Validity and Reliability 
Sociologists continue to debate the nature of social capital and how to measure it. 
There are also discussions about the exact nature of fields. I have contributed to those 
discussions, but until research scholars agree upon a common definition of key terms, there 
will always be doubts as to the validity of using any definition. 
Though it is my contention here that the network is the home of social capital and 
multiple memberships in related organizations indicates greater social capital, as well as 
revealing the presence of a field, there is need in future research for inclusion of positions 
within and among organizations. Even if no common definition can be arrived at soon, it 
should be possible to increase future external validity of similar efforts to this one, by 
including greater amounts of information about the natures of the interactions that constitute 
the relationships that I have referred to simply as memberships. 
Internal validity is most suspect here when considering the differences in 
demographics and other variables between Meadville and Hillside, though previous research 
with these data has addressed most of those issues adequately. (Agnitsch, 2003) This could 
be addressed by using more advanced statistical methods than my level of expertise allows, 
though this should be the easiest of all things to correct for in future efforts. 
Limitations and Opportunities 
The small number of communities and their purposive selection makes generalization 
of the results difficult. The limitation of actors to membership in three groups limited the use 
of the membership lattice. Network analysis techniques favor a small population, though 
with the introduction of membership lattice techniques it should be possible explore larger 
populations. 
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This effort is further limited by the inability, at this point, for social network theory to 
explain greater variations observed in communities. This is an early work in a young field. 
In the coming years we will approach a single technique that serves well in all cases. This 
will necessitate advancements in theory as well as advancement in techniques for gathering 
data. Particularly, measures involving the average size and the level of association among 
actors in groups in relation to the number of groups being connected, in the community field, 
should reveal a great deal. 
The biggest theoretical issue I see is in accounting for leadership and positionality 
within and among groups. Ethnographers observe that actors can position themselves to gain 
more social capital through key positions in key groups. There are cases where less involved 
actors are more endowed with social capital than more involved actors. If an actor takes on a 
leadership role within an organization that is entirely within the community field they would 
have a disproportionally powerful position as compared to other positions that may hold 
numerically greater leadership. I believe this can be accounted for by eliminating members 
of single organizations in larger populations, and weighing positions within organizations 
appropriately. It is an issue with rich opportunity for future work. 
Theoretical Contributions 
That a community field is made up of the instances of overlapping membership in 
community oriented interest organizations, is a powerful idea for empirical use. The idea of 
the community field is sociologically interesting and should be a part of network analysis, 
but without the use of lattices to bring together network theory and social capital, its location 
had not been empirically proven 
.A set of empirical definitions for community fields, along with a set of measures 
defining network ties, is important. The ability to devise further measures for network 
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structures, using a set of member lattices, which can then be consistently compared among 
communities of all sizes and varieties, is an important tool. 
An important the idea underlies this entire thesis is that all social measures must be 
relative to the immediate community. It has long been a rule in other scientific fields that 
absolutes are elusive, or nonexistent, but that valuable measures must be relative to 
something. In community studies, all measures should be held relative to the local 
community where they were taken. That is why all of the measures were designed to be 
expressed by numbers ranging from zero to one. That way, any two communities can be 
compared, while both are being held relative to their own localities. 
Methodological Contributions 
This thesis makes a major methodological contribution by suggesting a simple and 
reliable way to identify a community field. Further research will be necessary to show how 
well this technique can be applied to larger populations, and whether it can be used to 
incorporate the presence of leaders, and other descriptions of position, within groups. The 
analysis of the data presented in chapter four gives credence to the generalizability of the 
member lattice analysis method. 
This thesis begins to develop a way to analyze the internal structure of a community 
field for the presence of various sorts of social capital. The use of lattice structures in social 
analysis is not a new thing. In fact is goes back several decades, yet despite its clear power 
in recognizing and demonstrating structural relationships, it has not risen to a prominence in 
the field. I suspect this is in part due to the complex mathematics that have traditionally 
accompanies the use of lattices and the under-development of social sciences software for 
this purpose. I am hopeful that the techniques outlined here, which do not necessitate the use 
of complicated formulae, will make some progress toward correcting this condition. 
~~ 
Ultimately, this thesis laid the groundwork for developing network analysis 
techniques to look at social capital. Those techniques grow out of sociological theory, in 
opposition to previous techniques which came from network analysis and only later were 
given sociological significance. 
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APPENDIX 
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~ V~ V1 J J J 00 00 00 ~O ~O 
O~ W ~ O W Q~ N W `O ►-~ N ~ J 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
6 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
Actors 
~ 
r-+ ►--~ ~--• N N N N w W ~ t~ v~ O~ ~ J Oo Oo 00 ~O `O `O ►-~ w vi O vi O\ ~G O J ~ O ~ O~ ~O oo O v~ J O v~ O~ 
100 
100 
100 
101 
101 
101 
102 
102 
102 
104 
10 
104 
105 
105 
107 
107 
107 
108 
1083 
108 
1091 
109 
110 
1105 
1107 
1111 
1113 
1115 
1120 
1125 
1126 
1129 
1130 
1137 
1145 
1150 
1154 
1166 
1169 
1178 
1180 
1185 
1187 
1190 
1195 
1196 
00 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
80 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
80 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
440 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
60 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
41 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
00 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
21 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
90 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
80 
Table 3.3 — Meadville, One-Mode Binary, Actors. 
Actors 
~ N N w w ~ ~ ~. c.n c.n t~ O~ O~ O~ o0 00 ~O ~O ~G ~O `O O w ~l oo O v~ J O oo ~-+ c.n O~ N ~ v~ w J ~O w ~O O ~ ~ O~ J O 
3 
8 
1 
25 
27 
3 
38 
41 
45 
4 
52 
5 
55 
63 
67 
69 
83 
89 
90 
91 
94 
96 
97 
100 
101 
102 
105 
111 
115 
123 
139 
143 
149 
154 
166 
167 
171 
174 
175 
182 
185 
187 
200 
207 
2121 
1 
7 
0 
0 
6 
4 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 3.3 (continued -part 2) 
Actors 
D ~ D ~--~ ~--~ N W ~ ~ C.Jl ~ ~ ~] 
►--+ N V1 ~--+ C!~ W ~O W ~p ~ ~ J ►--~ 
3 
7 
8 
1 
25 
27 
3 
38 
41 
45 
46 
52 
54 
55 
63 
67 
69 
83 
89 
90 
91 
94 
0 96 
97 
100 
101 
102 
105 
111 
115 
123 
139 
143 
149 
154 
166 
167 
171 
174 
175 
182 
185 
187 
200 
207 
212 
1 
0 
0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1. 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
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Table 3.3 (continued -part 3) 
Actors 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N W 
W W W W W ~ ~P ~P t!i Q1 O~ ~] J 00 00 `O `O `p `O O 
W ~ Vt J 00 W ~ O\ ~ W 0o W 01 ►--+ Q~ ►--+ W C!1 0o O 
3 
7 
8 
10 
25 
27 
30 
38 
41 
45 
46 
52 
54 
55 
63 
67 
69 
83 
89 
90 
91 
94 
96 
97 
100 
101 
102 
105 
111 
115 
123 
139 
143 
149 
154 
166 
167 
171 
174 
175 
182 
185 
187 
200 
207 
212 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
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Table 3.3 (continued -part 4) 
Actors 
~--, N N w W ,P ~ ~ c,11 t~ v~ O~ O~ 01 00 00 ~O ~D ~O ti0 ~O O w J oo O c.,n ~l O oo ~ ~ O~ N ~ v~ w J ~O W ~O O ►—, ~ O~ J O 
215 
216 
219 
225 
233 
234 
235 
237 
238 
243 
244 
0 246 
~ 254 
263 
268 
273 
276 
281 
286 
291 
293 
295 
298 
300 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 l 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
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Table 3.3 (continued -part 5) 
Actors 
►—+ 
O 
►--~ 
►-~ 
O 
N 
►—+ 
O 
C1l 
►—+ 
►-~ 
►--► 
~-` 
►-~ 
C!~ 
►-~ 
N 
W 
~--+ w 
~O 
~-+ 
~ 
W 
~-+ 
~P 
~p 
215 
216 
219 
225 
233 
234 
235 
237 
238 
243 
244 
246 
254 
263 
268 
273 
276 
281 
286 
291 
293 
295 
298 
300 
~-+ ►--+ ►--+ ~--+ ~--~ ►-+ ~-+ ~--~ ►--~ N N N N N N N v~ O\ O~ J J J o0 00 0o O O ~ ►--~ ►--~ ~ N 
~ Q1 J ~--► ~ Vi 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ~0 1 1 1 ~l 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 l 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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215 
216 
219 
225 
233 
234 
235 
237 
238 
243 
244 
0 246 
~ 254 
263 
268 
273 
276 
281 
286 
291 
293 
295 
298 
300 
Table 3.3 (continued -part 6) 
Actors 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
W W W W W .p ~ C!1 Q1 ~ ~I ~] 00 
W ~ C!1 J 00 W 01 ~ W 00 W 01 r-r 
N N N N N W 
00 
~ 
~G 
~--' 
`p 
W 
\O 
CJ1 
\O 
00 
O 
O 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1, 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
86 
Table 3.4 — Hillside, Two-Mode, Binary, Actors and Projects. 
Projects 
Annex Ovrnss S.Cntr A. Cntr. I. Rcrt. C. Fnd. S. Bnd 
1000 
1006 
1008 
1011 
1017 
1019 
1027 
1028 
1029 
1043 
1044 
1046 
1053 
1054 
1070 
1073 
1076 
1082 
1083 
1089 
1091 
1092 
° 1104 U 
~ 1105 
1107 
1111 
1113 
1115 
1120 
1125 
1126 
1129 
1130 
1137 
1145 
1150 
1154 
1166 
1169 
1178 
1180 
1185 
1187 
1190 
1195 
1196 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
87 
Table 3.5 —Meadville, Two-Mode, Binary, Actors and Projects. 
Projects 
Mead Grocery Resource Teen Bicycle Mead Law 
Days Store Center Center Trail Days Enforcement 
Garden 
3 
7 
8 
10 
25 
27 
30 
38 
41 
45 
46 
52 
54 
55 
63 
67 
69 
83 
89 
90 
91 
94 
96 
97 
100 
101 
102 
105 
111 
115 
123 
139 
143 
149 
154 
166 
167 
171 
174 
175 
182 
185 
187 
200 
207 
212 
215 
216 
219 
225 
233 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
Projects 
Mead Grocery Resource Teen Bicycle Mead Law 
Days Store Center Center Trail Days Enforcement 
Garden 
0 
U 
234 
235 
237 
238 
243 
244 
246 
254 
263 
268 
273 
276 
281 
286 
291 
293 
295 
298 
300 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Land Annex 
Hwy Ovrpss 
°' Snr Cntr 'o 
~ Aqu Cntr 
Ind Recruit 
Comm Found 
Schl Bond 
U 
4~ 
~o 
a 
Land Annex 
Table 3.6 —Hillside, One-Mode, Weighted, Projects. 
Projects 
Snr Aqua Ind 
Cntr Cntr Recruit 
Hwy 
Ovrnss 
Comm 
Found 
S chl 
Bond 
6 
0 0 
3 3 0 
0 1 1 2 
0 0 4 2 2 
0 0 0 2 0 2 
Mead Days 
Grcry Store 
Rsrc Center 
Teen Center 
Bike Trail 
Mead D Garden 
Law Enf 
Table 3.7 —Meadville, One-Mode, Weighted, Projects. 
Projects 
Mead 
Days 
Grcry 
Store 
Rsrc 
Center 
Teen 
Center 
Bike 
Trail 
Mead D. 
Garden 
Law 
Enf 
1 
0 0 
3 1 2 
0 1 4 1 
4 0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 6 1 
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Table 3.8 - Hillside, One-Mode, Weighted, Actors. 
Actors 
1000 
1006 
1008 
1011 
1017 
1019 
1027 
1028 
1029 
1043 
1044 
1046 
1053 
1054 
1070 
1073 
1076 
1082 
1083 
1089 
1091 
1092 
0 1104 
~ 1105 
1107 
1111 
1113 
1115 
1120 
1125 
1126 
1129 
1130 
1137 
1145 
1150 
1154 
1166 
1169 
1178 
1180 
1185 
1187 
1190 
1195 
1196 
0 0 0 0 ~ 0 ►--~ 0 ~--+ 
O~ Oo ►--+ J ~O 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ►-~ ►.r ►-i 
N N N ~ ~ Vi Vi J J J 00 00 00 `O `O O O O 
J 00 ~O W ~ ~ W .~ O W O~ N W ~ ►--+ N ~ Vt J 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 2 1 2 2 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
2 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 2 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
90 
Table 3.8 (continued) 
Actors 
~ ~ 
~ ~ ►--+ N N N N W W ~ t~ Vt O~ O\ J 00 00 00 ~O ~O ~O 
~--+ w v~ O v~ ~ ~ O ~] v~ O ~ ~ ~O oo O v~ J O c~ ~ 
1000 
1006 
1008 
1011 
1017 
1019 
1027 
1028 
1029 
1043 
1044 
1046 
1053 
1054 
1070 
1073 
1076 
1082 
1083 
1089 
1091 
1092 
0 1104 
~ 1105 
1107 
1111 
1113 
1115 
1120 
1125 
1126 
1129 
1130 
1137 
1145 
1150 
1154 
1166 
1169 
1178 
1180 
1185 
1187 
1190 
1195 
1196 
2 1 1 2 3 3 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 
1 
1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
2 1 2 2 
1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 2 1 1 
1 2 2 1 2 2 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 3 2 2 
1 1 2 2 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 2 2 3 2 3 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
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Table 3.9 — Meadville, One-Mode, Weighted, Actors. 
Actors 
~-+ N N w W ~ ~ ~ v~ v~ vi O~ O~ ~ o0 00 ~O ~O LO `O ~ O 
W J 00 O t11 J O d0 ►--+ t!1 O~ N ~P Vi W J ~O W ~O O ►-~ ~P O\ ~l O 
3 
7 
8 
10 
25 
27 
30 
38 
41 
45 
46 
52 
54 
55 
63 
67 
69 
83 
89 
90 
91 
94 
96 
0 97 
~ 100 
101 
102 
105 
111 
115 
123 
139 
143 
149 
154 
166 
167 
171 
174 
175 
182 
185 
187 
200 
207 
212 
215 
216 
3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
2 2 1 2 1 2 
2 1 2 1 1 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
2 2 2 1 1 2 1 
1 2 2 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 3 1 
1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 2 2 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 
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Table 3.9 (continued -part 2) 
Actors 
W J 00 ►-r N N W W ~ ~P ~ V1 c.h C11 O\ O~ O~ 00 00 ~O `O ~O `O ~O ►--~ 
O c.n ~] O oo ~--~ v~ p~ N ~ v~ w J `C w ~O O ~ ~ ~ J O 
O 
219 
225 
233 
234 
235 
237 
238 
243 
244 
0 246 
254 
263 
268 
273 
276 
281 
286 
291 
293 
295 
298 
300 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 
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Table 3.9 (continued -part 3) 
Actors 
3 
7 
8 
10 
25 
27 
30 
38 
41 
45 
46 
52 
54 
55 
63 
67 
69 
83 
89 
90 
91 
94 
96 
0 97 
~ 10 
101 
10 
105 
111 
115 
123 
139 
143 
149 
154 
166 
167 
171 
174 
175 
182 
185 
187 
200 
207 
212 
215 
216 
O ~-+ 
~-+ 
O 
N 
r-+ ~--~ ►--+ ~-+ ~-+ 
O ►--, ~--~ N w 
V1 ~--► Ch W `O 
~P 
W 
~ r.-► ~--+ r--~ ~--+ ►--+ 
Vt Q1 01 ~l J ~l 
~ O~ J ~ ~ C!1 
r-+ r~ ~-+ 
N ~ J 
N 
O 
N _N N_
~ N C11 
N ~-+ N N ~-+ N 
~ ~ 
1 
O1 
20 
0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
94 
219 
225 
233 
234 
235 
237 
238 
243 
244 
246 
0 254 
~ 263 
268 
273 
276 
281 
286 
291 
293 
295 
298 
300 
~--+ 
O 
N 
O 
C~ 
~-+ 
►-~ ►--~ 
►-r N 
V1 W 
~-+ ~-+ ~ 
~ ~ ~ 
~O ~ O~ 
Table 3.9 (continued -part 4) 
Actors 
~-+ ►--+ ~ 
O~ ~l J 
J ~ ~ 
►--~ ►--i ~ 
J 00 00 
C!1 N Vi 
~.-+ 
00 
N 
O 
N 
O 
N ►-r N ~ 
N 
r-+ 
N 
►-~ 
N 
N 
J O J N Ch O~ ~ ~ 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 
2 1 1 
1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Table 3.9 (continued -part 5) 
Actors 
3 
7 
8 
10 
25 
27 
30 
38 
41 
45 
46 
52 
54 
55 
63 
67 
69 
83 
89 
90 
91 
94 
96 
97 
100 
~ 101 
102 
105 
111 
115 
123 
139 
143 
149 
154 
166 
167 
171 
174 
175 
182 
185 
187 
200 
207 
212 
215 
216 
N N N N N 
w w w w w w .~ v~ v o0 w 
N N N N N N N N N N N N W 
~ Vi O~ O~ J J 00 00 ~O ~O ~O ~O O 
o~ ~ w oo w ~ ~--~ o~ ►-r w v~ oo O 
1 1 1 1 2 
1 2 
2 1 1 1 
2 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 
1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
2 
1 1 
1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 
96 
Table 3.9 (continued -part 6) 
219 
225 
233 
234 
235 
237 
238 
243 
244 
246 
0 254 
~ 263 
268 
273 
276 
281 
286 
291 
293 
295 
298 
300 
N N 
w w 
w ~ 
Actors 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N w w w w ~► ~ ~P v~ ~ O~ J J o0 00 ~G ~O ~O `O O 
v~ ~ oo w ~ o~ ~ w oo w v~ ~ o~ ~ w ~ oo O 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 
2 1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 
1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 2 2 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 2 
1 
1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 
Table 4.1 -Meadville Hierarchical Clustering Of Equivalence Matrix (from UCINET) 
Level 
Actor 
1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 
6 8 9 4 4 4 5 1 3 2 4 1 9 6 3 0 9 9 1 3 7 5 9 6 
6 7 0 5 6 6 8 4 6 8 5 3 2 8 9 3 7 3 5 5 9 6 4 6 8 
0.000 XXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX . 
2.000 XXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX . 
2.494 XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX . 
3.464 XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX XX 
3.742 XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX XX 
3.787 XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX XX 
4.722 XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX XX 
5.172 XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX XX 
5.385 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX XX 
5.562 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX 
6.150 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX 
6.570 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX 
6.944 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX 
7.392 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX 
8.243 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
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Table 4.1 - (continued) 
Actor 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 
7 5 4 3 1 6 2 8 2 1 0 4 7 9 8 5 0 3 9 4 3 3 2 
3 2 9 0 5 7 7 9 3 3 7 0 0 3 1 1 1 4 1 8 7 1 4 7 5 
Level 
0.000 
2.000 
2.494 
3.464 
3 .742 
3.787 
4.722 
5.172 
5.385 
5.562 
6.150 
6.570 
6.944 
7.392 
8.243 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Table 4.1 - (continued -part 2) 
Level 
0.000 
2.000 
2.494 
3.464 
3.742 
3 .787 
4.722 
5.172 
5.385 
5.562 
6.150 
6.570 
6.944 
7.392 
8.243 
Actor 
2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 
8 5 8 6 4 8 0 3 7 8 1 6 0 7 9 9 6 1 0 0 
6 5 3 3 4 5 2 5 4 2 9 7 5 5 4 1 3 1 0 0 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX . 
. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
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Table 4.2 - Hillside Hierarchical Clustering Of Equivalence Matrix (from UCINET) 
Actor 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
2 3 4 7 0 1 6 3 9 7 1 8 8 0 0 5 5 4 2 4 1 6 8 0 4 
9 0 6 3 8 5 9 7 1 6 1 9 3 5 7 4 3 4 9 5 9 6 7 0 3 
Level 
0.000 
1.414 
2.000 
3.464 
3.571 
4.000 
4.255 
4.257 
4.261 
5.382 
5.687 
6.071 
7.215 
. XXXXXXX XXXXX 
. XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XX 
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Table 4.2 - (continued) 
Level 
0.000 
1.414 
2.000 
3 .464 
3.571 
4.000 
4.255 
4.257 
4.261 
5.382 
5.687 
6.071 
7.215 
Actor 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 2 8 1 0 9 2 2 0 2 8 1 7 2 5 1 9 9 5 8 9 
0 5 5 7 6 2 7 8 4 6 2 1 8 0 4 3 5 0 0 0 6 
X XXXXXXXXXXX 
X XXXXXXXXXXX 
X XXXXXXXXXXX 
X XXXXXXXXXXX 
X XXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
. XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX 
. XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX 
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX 
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX 
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
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